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This thesis tests the hypothesis that the U.S. policy makers—represented by Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson during the Truman Administration—adopted a hostile image of 
Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. To examine 
Acheson’s image of Communist China, the research used the content analysis method to 
analyze his statements, and a computer-based analysis program—DICTION 7.0—was 
used to obtain more objective evidence.  
From analyzing the results—scores of the aggressive and optimistic tone in the 
statements regarding Communist China—the research showed that an aggressive tone 
significantly increased after the Chinese intervention, indicating a change in Acheson’s 
view of China. Although the optimistic tone in Acheson’s statements regarding 
Communist China did not significantly change, which suggests less support for the 
hypothesis, manual analysis of the statements was presented to explain the results; 
Acheson did not have an optimistic view of Communist China from the beginning, so 
there was little change even after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. With the 
supporting results and explanations, this thesis argues that Acheson did develop a hostile 
image of Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................3 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS ................................................................4 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................5 
1. The Individual’s Perception in Policy Making ..................................5 
2. U.S. Perceptions and Images of China .............................................10 
E. METHOD AND THESIS OVERVIEW.......................................................13 
II. THE SUBJECT AND THE METHOD ....................................................................17 
A. THE INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ..........................17 
B. ACHESON’S INFLUENCE ON THE U.S. CHINA POLICY ..................18 
C. CONTENT ANALYSIS ................................................................................21 
D. USING DICTION AS A TOOL FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS ................27 
III. ANALYSIS OF ACHESON’S STATEMENTS ......................................................33 
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA .................................................................35 
B. TIMELINE OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS ...............................................37 
C. ANALYSIS OF ACHESON’S STATEMENTS USING DICTION 7.0 ....40 
D. THE MANUAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATEMENTS ............................45 
1. Before the Proclamation of the People’s Republic of China ..........45 
2. After the Establishment of the PRC until the Formation of the 
Sino-Soviet Alliance ...........................................................................47 
3. After the Sino-Soviet Treaty to the Chinese Intervention in the 
Korean War ........................................................................................52 
4. After the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War ........................56 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS ..............................................................................61 
A. ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-COMMUNIST CHINA RELATIONS ..............61 
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE DICTION 7.0 RESULTS ...................................61 
C. ASSESSMENT OF THE MAIN TERMS THAT DESCRIBE 
COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE TIMELINE .............................................64 
D. FINAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................................66 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................71 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................75 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Aggression Score of Acheson’s Statements ....................................................62 
Figure 2. Optimism Score of Acheson’s Statements. ......................................................63 
Figure 3. Terms Used to Describe Communist China.....................................................65 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 








I thank the Naval Postgraduate School for giving me a chance to study with one 
of the best faculties and students in the world. I especially thank Professor Michael 
Glosny and Professor Christopher Twomey for guiding me through my thesis. They have 
taught me not only academic knowledge, but also what is important in life. I will always 
think of your great lectures and guidance.  
I thank the wonderful people I met during my stay in the United States. I 
especially thank Dora Martinez who helped my family in the time of need. More 
importantly, I thank God, country, and family for always being there for me. 
 xiv 




This research answers the question of when and why the U.S. policy makers 
adopted a hostile perception of China. It sets a hypothesis that the policy makers—
represented by Secretary of State Dean Acheson during the Truman Administration—
adopted a hostile image of Communist China only after the Chinese intervention in the 
Korean War and not after the Communist victory, nor the signing of the Sino-Soviet 
Alliance. In an attempt to examine Acheson’s view of Communist China, the research 
used the content analysis method to analyze his statements. To support the assessment, a 
computer based analysis program—DICTION 7.0—was used to obtain more objective 
evidence. By analyzing the results the program provided—the aggressive and optimistic 
tone in the statements regarding Communist China—the research found that an 
aggressive tone significantly increased after the Chinese intervention, indicating a change 
in China’s image. Also, the research found that while the optimistic tone in the statements 
regarding Communist China did not significantly change, it concluded that there was a 
possibility that Acheson did not have an optimistic view of Communist China from the 
beginning. After analyzing official statements regarding Communist China, the research 
found that Acheson’s view of China did shift after the Chinese intervention in the Korean 
War, and it was hostile. The research also found possible pre-existing perceptions 
Acheson had of the Chinese Communists, which were that China was a weak and less 
capable regime.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
As seen in the U.S.-China relationship, state images projected by the leadership of 
one country and the perception of these images by leadership of another country affect 
the fundamental attitude driving policies regarding each other. So by analyzing what 
view the leadership—the foreign policy makers—has of other states can be an important 
factor to understand why a particular policy was formed. China—once a weak, divided 
nation—suddenly obtained status as a major power in the international community during 
the twentieth century. Until rapprochement in 1972, the United States perceived China to 
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be a Soviet puppet. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the increasing economic rise 
of China has led to a concentration of attention from the rest of the world. Recently, the 
debate regarding whether the rise of China will be peaceful or lead to instability is 
increasing. Despite China’s participation in the international community—in which they 
announced support for a peaceful and stable political environment—some U.S policy 
decision makers find it difficult to believe the Chinese due to their capabilities that appear 
to be designed to challenge U.S. influence in the Asian region. Regardless of China’s 
intentions, as long as the United States perceives China as a threat, there will be obstacles 
that lead to competition or problems in future U.S-China relations.  
This is a much-studied issue in international relations scholarship. David 
Shambaugh argues that images are important because people’s interpretation of an event 
or phenomenon as a result, shapes the individual’s subsequent behavior.1 While Robert 
Jervis identifies the effects of mass information, he also suggests that an image of a 
subject dwells in the individual mind for a long period, and eventually influences the 
actions of the individual. 2  On a broader level, Michael Kulma notes that the state 
interaction is a function of how an issue is perceived by policy decision makers of the 
state.3 
The issue of perceptions and images leads to the major research question. After 
Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the United 
States and the PRC had repeated conflict for the next twenty years. A new era of U.S-
Sino relations opened only in 1972, when President Nixon arrived in Beijing. Before the 
twenty-year severance of diplomatic relations, when and why did the United States—the 
policy decision makers—adopt a hostile perception of China? This thesis will focus on 
one particular individual foreign policy maker—Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State 
during the Truman Administration—and will argue that despite the escalation in the 
                                                 
1 David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972‒1990 (Princeton, NJ; 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 17. 
2 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 308. 
3 Michael G. Kulma, “The Evolution of U.S. Images of China,” World Affairs 162, no. 2 (1999), 76, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672574. 
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conflicts between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese 
intervention in the Korean War was the main factor that caused the shift to a hostile 
image of China. The unexpected display of force by China (once perceived as weak and 
incapable), changed the image of China to one of an evil and barbaric communist 
imperialist.4 
B. IMPORTANCE 
There have been changes in Chinese and American views of each other 
throughout history. Shambaugh argues that a large gap exists in perceptions within U.S.-
China relations. On the Chinese side, national disunity and impotence in the face of 
imperialist aggression for more than a century have left an indelible mark that leads to a 
deeply imbedded negative U.S image, and the Chinese America watchers are “blinded” 
by these very images.5 Various events and factors are responsible for this phenomenon. 
Different historical backgrounds and cultures can be a cause. Also, extremely different 
development experiences and values complicate forming mutual images of the other. 
For almost twenty years, the United States viewed China as a dangerous 
adversary. The United States’ general policy was to weaken and contain the Chinese 
Communist government. The leadership in Washington recognized China as an aggressor 
in the international community, and that Chinese expansionism threatened the security of 
its neighbors in East Asia. In order to contain China, the United States planned a line of 
military alliances along Chinese borders. The alliances included Japan, South Korea, and 
the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Supported by these allies, the United States 
established the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. The organization starting from 
Thailand and the Philippines, and with the additional ANZUS Treaty that added Australia, 
New Zealand, the United States formed a line that contained the Chinese mainland. The 
United States stationed troops in many of the allied countries—especially Japan and 
South Korea—and maintained military presence in the surrounding region. During these 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, no. 25, PT2 (Washington, DC: Office 
of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1951), 925. 
5 Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990, 41, 283. 
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years, the United States intervened in the war in Vietnam; in which China was also 
involved and the leaders in Washington requested the allies not to establish normal 
relations with China. The United States government prohibited American citizens from 
visiting China—even for personal reasons. It could be said that Washington broke off 
trade and conducted an international embargo of Communist China.6 
While channels of communication have multiplied since then, mutual impressions 
have not improved to a corresponding degree. This inconstant perspective of each other 
matters because images and perceptions influence actions in both official and unofficial 
ways. The importance of this thesis is to identify the historical events that affected policy 
makers’ formulation of the image of China during the early period of U.S-China relations. 
Also, the thesis provides a method for understanding the way images are formed, and 
how they can be recognized. It also illustrates the unique U.S.-China relationship, which 
continues to have implications today. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
An image of another state is not the only factor that has influence over foreign 
policy. According to James Rosenau, there are five major factors that influence foreign 
policy decisions. The societal, external, and global environments, as well as 
governmental settings are the major contributors in influencing policy making. Also, the 
roles of policy makers and individual characteristics of decision-making leaders matter.7 
While these factors are the ones that are popularly studied by scholars and decision 
makers, not many study the effects of images of another state. In that sense, this paper 
focuses on only the image factor in foreign policy. It examines the U.S. perception of 
China that affected the formation of America’s China policy.  
Also, factors that influence foreign policy change over time. Values, norms, and 
institutions evolve as the world changes. For example, there is a significant difference in 
human rights, before and after modernization. It can be said that factors that determine 
                                                 
6 Barnett A. Doak, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy (New York: Harper, 
1960), 122. 
7 James Rosenau, “From Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Classics of International 
Relations, 3rd ed., ed. John A. Vasquez (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), 243. 
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foreign policy have changed over time. For example, evidence of U.S-China relations can 
be found back to the Qing Dynasty. The images of China have indeed changed, as well as 
the factors that affect foreign policy. Even during the 1950s to the early 1970s, there were 
numerous incidents that could have caused America to hold a negative image of China. A 
single incident is unlikely be the solitary reason for a national perception.  
Thus, this research limits the time under examination during the Truman 
administration. In the time frame, three events will be examined to explain the potential 
turning points of the shift in China’s image—particularly in Acheson’s cognition of 
China. The establishment of a communist state in mainland China, the formation of a 
Sino-Soviet alliance, and the Chinese intervention in the Korean War can be said to have 
influence in the matter. While each event will be emphasized as a driver where the U.S. 
policy makers could have recognized Communist China as a threat, the thesis examines 
the hypothesis that despite other incidents, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War 
was the main factor that formed a hostile image of China and dominated the U.S. China 
policy until the U.S.-China normalization. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, the existing literatures that develop the initial question and 
assumptions of the research are presented. It also states the problems identified from 
statements of various authors who argue the shift in the image of China occurred after the 
Chinese intervention in the Korean War. 
1. The Individual’s Perception in Policy Making 
Despite various factors that determine foreign policy, there is no definite and 
single one that dominates the rest. As complex as it is, there could be multiple reasons 
why a state acts towards another state. Jervis argues that it is difficult to examine policy 






the surrounding environment. The cognition of the world around them is part of the main 
cause of the relevant behavior.
8
 Other literatures suggest that perceptions and images are 
an important factor in a country’s response. 
Most of the studies on policy making are focused on how the government and the 
policy makers act. K. J. Holsti argues that before analyzing how they act, it is more 
important to analyze why the policy makers act a certain way. He talks about the role of 
political figures and the influence they have on diplomatic issues. So it could be thought 
that the role of a national image is based on the argument of the importance of analyzing 
the individual and the small group as the core of the decision making process. It is also 
based on the cognitive approach that the decision maker is influenced by the perception 
of the world he or she has.
9
 As stated in the beginning, Jervis argues that people tend to 
simplify the uncertain world to a point where it becomes manageable. In the process, a 
belief system or an image of a subject dwells in the individual mind for a long period, and 
after constituting the logical system of the mind, a cognitive consistency tends to 
constantly formulate the actions of the individual.
10
 
Kulma posits that the perceptual approach assumes that state interaction is a 
function of how an issue is perceived by policy decision makers. It is a course that 
acknowledges the role of variables such as, motivation, personality, bureaucratic 
pressures, and other factors that influence the actions of states within the international 
political system. The perceptual system builds mental representations through the use of 
psychological mechanisms, one of which categorizes an object or situation based on 
elements or attributes that are shared with similar phenomena, objects, and people. The 
products of this psychological mechanism, or categorization, are mental representations 
in the form of images, which have been found to influence the decisions of those 
responsible for the formulation of foreign policy.
11
 
                                                 
8 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 28‒29.  
9 K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. 5
th
 ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1988), 318. 
10 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 308. 
11 Kulma, “The Evolution of U.S. Images of China,” 76. 
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Historical incidents have massive influence on the perception of the future, and as 
an effect, can constitute or can be used on the analogy of another county’s image.12  
Distinctive incidents, such as massive war, will form a new image of the opposing 
country, and the next administration will make policy choices with the new image as 
reference. This is matches Jervis’s argument that a cognitive consistency tends to 




Although the cognitive consistency leading to actions of an individual is 
important, the effects of the individual factor on decision making can be regarded as the 
most controversial in the field of foreign policy analysis. The individual factor implies 
that personal characteristics, processes of cognition, and perceptions or beliefs of a 
‘human agency’ play a crucial role in making of a foreign policy. The basis of this 
argument is that, in the end, the individual human makes the decisions that shape a policy, 
not organizations or states.14 Although the individual factor is important in understanding 
foreign policy, it should be noted that the ‘human agency’ is also significantly 
constrained by both the domestic and international political systems. 
The individual factor in decision making has been denigrated for a long period of 
time. Irving Janis states that the individual plays the least significant part in politics.15 
Even in the psychological field, many recognize that there are a number of situations 
where external factors tend to dominate the internal process in the course of decision 
making.16 Still, there are others who oppose these arguments such as Zeev Maoz and 
Anat Shayer, who state that the individual factor in foreign policy should not be 
neglected, and the evidence they use to support this argument is the significant events—
                                                 
12 Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics 20, no. 3 (1968): 470, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009777. 
13 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 308. 
14 Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy (London: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 13. 
15 Irving Lester Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and 
Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1972), 3. 
16 Margaret G. Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of 
Political Leaders,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 1(1980): 49, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600126. 
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such as the conflicts between the Israeli Prime Ministers and the Knesset leading to 
escalation—in which the actions of a ‘human agency’ play a key part in international 
relations.17 Nonetheless, given that the international and domestic environment allows 
the capacity for the individual influence, this study will maintain that the individual factor 
is essential. 
When considering the individual factor in foreign policy making, it is important to 
identify the systematic conditions where the ‘human agency’ can make a crucial 
influence. Jenson identifies these situations, and analyzes the conditions where the 
individual significantly dominates the decision making process. He argues that the best 
condition for the human factor to have a decisive impact in the process is when the 
individual needs to display interest in foreign affairs, be in a position that has a high 
degree of decisional latitude, and be confronted by a non-routine situation that has 
ambiguous information.18 Non-routine situations and situations that have little or too 
much information are more likely to be affected by the individual factor. Therefore, 
disregarding the rational decisions made by observing external factors, supporters of the 
psychological models in policy making assume that decisions are not made by the 
calculative reasoning, but by the perceptions of an individual decision maker. 
When disregarding the external factors that could have ultimate influence in the 
policy making process, it can be argued that knowing the perception of a policy maker 
can give foreign policy analysts discernible explanations for the reasons why certain 
policies were made, and if possible, provide guidance in predictions regarding decision 
making. Supporting this argument, Margaret Hermann has stated that predictions in 





                                                 
17 Zeev Maoz and Anat Shayer, “The Cognitive Structure of Peace and War Argumentation: Israeli 
Prime Ministers versus the Knesset,” Political Psychology 8, no. 4 (1987): 576, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3790923. 
18 Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, 14‒15. 
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personality, and idiosyncrasies. The prediction can be made because examining the 
personal behavior is equivalent to analyzing the predisposition of the individual decision 
maker.19 
It is essential to recognize that cognition and personality of an individual are 
fundamentally connected, because predictions are made by analyzing the cognitive 
processes that are involved in decision making. This implies that the cognition structure 
of the individual relies on experience, role in the system, and the natural belief system. 
Jervis implies that cognition is essential in forming perception, and understanding the 
way in which a decision maker perceives him or herself, the enemy, and the world, which 
is crucial in analyzing policy decisions.20 
Because personal ideas, background, and perceptions of an individual affect the 
process of information, it can be said that it also affects the decisional outputs. The role 
of cognitive consistency—when individual decision makers assert that the outcomes of 
situations match their belief system—supports this idea. In extreme cases, this process 
may develop into cognitive dissonance. The individual decision maker could avoid or 
justify alternative information that opposes his or her perception of the world.  
With the explanations of individual factors affecting foreign policy decision 
making, and the ways that can help in providing explanations and making predictions, it 
is important to know how to analyze the individual factor—the way to examine the 
perception of an individual about a certain subject. Hermann states that indirect measures 
are commonly used to assess the individual character or perception, such as a policy 
maker’s statements, speeches, and responses to questions in press conferences.21 This 
thesis will pursue that line. It will choose an individual with significant influence in 
foreign policy making during the early Cold War years—when the Truman 
Administration in the United States was forming a new China policy—and choose a 
                                                 
19 Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political 
Leaders,” 43‒44.  
20 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 8‒9. 
21 Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political 
Leaders,” 14.  
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method to analyze his or her perception of China which—as stated in the literature 
above—could have influenced the actions and decisions in the policy forming process. 
The individual factor during this period is particularly important, due to the events 
between the United States and the newly formed Communist China. Although U.S.-China 
relations will be mentioned in more detail in the later part of this thesis, it could be noted 
that the U.S. China policy did not recognizably shift until the Chinese intervention in the 
Korean War. External factors, such as the proclamation of the PRC, the Sino-Soviet 
treaty, and other provocations, as well as criticism of the State Department from 
Congress for not taking a strong stance against the Communist Chinese did not 
necessarily shape a firm China policy. This meant that despite conflict between states and 
pressure from domestic politicians, another factor—the individual factor—had more 
influence on shaping the China policy during the Truman Administration.  
2. U.S. Perceptions and Images of China 
The debate between U.S policy makers on whether to consider and treat China 
like the Soviet communist regime had been going on since the birth of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Cohen states that in the mid-1920s the United States observed the 
forming of a communist China, but did not consider engaging in anti-imperialism or 
agitation like the Soviets. The U.S view of Chinese communism was a not a Western 
form, and the policy makers had a strong perception that it would not succeed. The U.S 
administration, at that time, believed that the victory of the Nationalists was the utmost 
solution in defending China and the rest of the world against evil Soviet powers. The 
United States also thought that in the end, China would turn into a pro-American liberal, 
democratic state.22  
John Spanier, in his views on American foreign policy since World War II, states 
that a huge misconception took place in the process of forming an image of China. The 
United States evaluated the Chinese Communist Party without preliminary distrust, and 
encouraged by this optimism, thought that there was a possibility in an agreement 
                                                 
22 Warren I. Cohen, America’s Respond to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, 4th ed. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 138. 
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between the Nationalist and the Communist party during their civil war. With the 
cooperation between the two parties, the United States thought that it could propagate 
American values and beliefs of democratic liberalism onto the China mainland. Chinese 
communism was not viewed like the Soviet imperialism, and in the end, the U.S thought 
was that the KMT would eventually defeat the Communist Party. So, U.S. negotiations 
with the CCP were considered unnecessary.23 
When the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed in February 
14, 1950, U.S.-China relations deteriorated. When the PRC seized the U.S. consulate in 
Beijing and as the diplomats went home, it was the end of the official contact between the 
United States and China. Schaller states that even after the rupture, Acheson told 
Congress, before the United States took any dramatic and new initiatives in China, it 
should “wait for the dust to settle.”24 Acheson also implied that once the new communist 
regime began governing, and after the KMT in Taiwan collapsed, the PRC might act 
more moderately and renew diplomatic relations with the United States again. 25  Of 
course, in the end this did not occur until the 1970s. 
Warren Cohen argues that “the Chinese intervention in Korea hardened American 
opposition to the Beijing regime and widened the circle of Americans who sought 
Chiang’s return to power” and that the “criticism of the administration’s earlier refusal to 
aid the KMT against the Communist mounted when the young American soldiers died at 
the hands of Mao’s armies.”26 He states, “When the events of the Korean War convinced 
the most men of the monolithic nature of international communism, the earlier 
contentions that Chinese Communism had a strong nationalistic flavor, that Mao would 
not serve as Stalin’s puppet, and that, like it or not, the Chinese Communists would 
                                                 
23 John Spanier, American Foreign Policy since World War II, 17
h
 ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2007), 67‒68. 
24 Dean Acheson quoted in Michael Schaller, The United States and China: Into the 21st Century 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 119. 
25 Ibid., 119. 
26 Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, 5th ed. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 190. 
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ultimately triumph seemed naïve to many.”27 The Chinese who were traditionally viewed 
with “contempt, pity, and compassion” by the American people had “become one of their 
most feared enemies.”28 
Jervis states that the Korean War initiated the start of a firm U.S. containment 
strategy of communism.29 Beyond the evil image of communism that affected the foreign 
policy of the United States, the war in Korea with the Chinese intervention significantly 
altered U.S. policy, and led to an increase in the U.S-China hostility that followed. It 
convinced decision makers that China was fundamentally hostile to the United States. 
Others thought that China became hostile to a capitalist country after the proclamation of 
the PRC.  
As stated before, Cohen argues that due to the Chinese intervention in the Korean 
War, the traditional view of contempt, sympathy, and compassion towards the Chinese 
people turned into one of the most hostile attitudes in history.30 The alteration in the 
image of China led to policy changes as well. The U.S policy makers considered 
communism as a Soviet attempt to expand its influence in the region for world 
dominance. As a result, the policy for a communist China was containment. This 
judgment of the U.S. administration led to the perception that the communist states in 
Asia, such as China, Vietnam, and Russia had the same intentions in their national 
interest. Although the expectations and hope were for Chinese nationalism, Truman and 
his advisors concluded that China was an anti-American state whether Mao was 
independent of the Soviet influence or not. Consequently, the indiscriminate U.S view of 
the communist ideology interrupted the possibilities of diplomatic means in resolving 
issues with communist states. 
The image of a Soviet puppet combined with the image of an anti-status quo 
power also increased the hostile appearance of the Chinese. In the historical sense, the 
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Chinese intervention in the Korean War could have been a lesson that China was ready to 
use military means to protect its national interests and security as a full sovereign state. 
But, the leaders in Washington saw the Chinese use of force from another point of view. 
U.S. policy makers became anxious about China’s goal in integration of territory and its 
aggressive character. Also, Doak states that the Korean War, which involved many U.S. 
casualties, was the major factor that affected the American attitudes towards the 
Communist regime.31 Cohen states that after the Korean War, despite their hopes for 
Chinese nationalism, the Truman leadership was forced to conclude that whether Mao 
was independent or not, he was intensely anti-American. Mao’s hostility was 
reciprocated when Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 
Dean Rusk officially declared the People’s Republic of China a “Slavic Manchukuo,” 
implying that it was a puppet state of the Soviet Union in 1951.32 The perception of a 
poor, weak, and divided nation changed into a single totalitarian state and the Chinese 
Communist Party as a force to spread the influence of communism over the borders. 
While the literature shows that a certain image formed during a certain point in 
the tense relations between the United States and Communist China, most neglect 
objective evidence to support their arguments. The authors simply state that the image of 
China shifted due to the events that affected the U.S.-China relationship. Though in the 
general sense it could be logical that an individual’s image of another state changed after 
a huge event, it lacks the visual data—such as content analysis results of the policy 
maker—to support the assumption. So, while it can be generally admitted that an 
aggressive image of China formed after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, this 
thesis will provide other forms of statistical data to strengthen the validity of the 
argument. 
E. METHOD AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
The problem in addressing images in international politics is that countries do not 
have images of other countries; individuals have images of other countries. The 
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individuals that matter in the case are the ones that make political decisions. But which 
have the most or the more crucial influence on America’s view of China? The problem 
lies in choosing the individuals which must be done with the utmost objectivity in order 
to prevent false inference. 
There are various individuals who shape foreign policy. While many play 
different roles, this thesis limits its research to one main individual who had prominent 
influence in shaping the U.S. China policy. Melvyn Leffler refers to Harry S. Truman, 
George C. Marshall, Dean G. Acheson, George Kennan, and Paul Nitze, as the ones who 
were the major players in forming America’s Grand Strategy from 1945 to 1952.33 
Among these five important political figures, one specific individual, Dean Acheson will 
be selected for his influence in shaping foreign policy during the early years of the 
Truman administration. The importance of Acheson’s role as Secretary of State and his 
relationship with the president will be addressed later in the thesis. 
As the goal of this research is to test the hypothesis that Acheson adopted a 
hostile view of Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the 
thesis will need to explain why Acheson was selected to represent the U.S. foreign policy 
making circle—especially in regard to the China policy, and the method to identify an 
image of an individual. The following chapter will present Acheson’s role as the 
Secretary of State to illustrate the general influence he had on foreign policy making. As 
the study is about the image of China held by the U.S. leadership, Acheson’s influence on 
determining the U.S. China policy will be presented to emphasize that he is the 
appropriate individual the study should focus on. Also, in the chapter, the method to 
identify Acheson’s view of China will be addressed. As content analysis is used in many 
studies to identify and measure belief systems and images of certain subjects, the research 
will also pursue the method. It will first identify the advantages and the limitations of the 
method, and find a way to reinforce its validity when used. In an attempt to provide more 
objective data—one of the limits identified in the use of content analysis—the research 
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will introduce the use of a computer-aided content analysis program named DICTION 
7.0. The analysis of statements will be provided in numeric forms, which allows the 
researcher to have a statistical view in evaluating the China image of Acheson.  
With the content analysis method, statements of Acheson are analyzed in Chapter 
III. It provides a description of the statements being used to verify that the data is not 
biased in favor of the researcher. A timeline of U.S.-China relations follows to identify 
possible turning points which could have caused Acheson’s China image to shift. After 
identifying three potential points in the relations, analysis results of the statements 
regarding Communist China are presented. Also, a manual analysis is conducted to 
provide possible explanations of the DICTION 7.0 results. Implementing the possible 
turning points, the analysis of the statements is divided into four categories—before the 
proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, after the proclamation of the PRC until 
the Sino-Soviet Treaty, after the Sino-Soviet Treaty until the Chinese intervention in the 
Korean War, and after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The chapter focuses 
on the effort to identify certain images of Communist China—hostile or weak—from the 
statements made during the periods above. 
In Chapter IV, U.S.-China relations are assessed to state that the possibilities of 
Acheson developing a hostile image of Communist China was constantly increasing 
while the DICTION results—in numerical scores of “Aggression” and “Optimism” 
detected in the statements—state that the shift in image occurred after the Chinese 
intervention in the Korean War. Main terms that describe Communist China in Acheson’s 
statements will be presented as supporting evidence. In the concluding chapter, the 
implication of the research and its use in future situations where images of states 
influence policy making, are presented. 
From analyzing the results—scores of the aggressive and optimistic tone in the 
statements regarding Communist China—the research showed that an aggressive tone 
significantly increased after the Chinese intervention, indicating a change in Acheson’s 
China image. Although the optimistic tone in Acheson’s statements regarding 
Communist China did not significantly change, which suggests less support for the 
hypothesis, manual analysis of the statements is presented to explain the results; Acheson 
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did not have an optimistic view of Communist China from the beginning, so there was 
little change even after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. With the supporting 
results and explanations, this thesis argues that Acheson did develop a hostile image of 
Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. 
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II. THE SUBJECT AND THE METHOD  
This chapter presents the individual on which the research focuses. The study will 
use a specific individual to analyze the effects of personal perception influencing policy 
decision making by evaluating the influence of the Secretary of State, specifically Dean 
Acheson during the Truman administration. 
A. THE INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
Before evaluating Acheson for his individual beliefs, research must be done on 
the institution, and his position in the institution, to determine how much influence it had 
in the decision making process. Leffler states that with the death of President Roosevelt, 
Harry S. Truman was left with the greatest military and economic power in the world. 
But the new leadership was concerned with finding a new way of keeping the American 
dominance in the world. Truman’s task was to forge a new world order based on 
nonaggression, self-determination, equal access to raw materials, nondiscriminatory trade, 
and liberal participation in international organizations. But in the first period of 1945, the 
leadership had no idea of how to translate the task into policy. So, Truman decided to 
form a new Policy Planning Staff that would shape U.S. foreign policy in the future. The 
State Department in the Truman administration was in charge of setting priorities to forge 
a new strategy: Containment of communism’s influence and the continuance of U.S. 
influence in the international community. It can be assumed that as the State Department 
was given a huge task, the leadership—in spite of the opposition in other political 
sectors—approved of the activities and the products of the Department. So, it can be said 
that the State Department had sufficient legitimacy during the Truman administration. 
This also implies that the head of the State Department, Dean Acheson, had substantial 
influence in the process of foreign policy making.34  Next, the study assesses the level of 
influence the Secretary of State has in the department and in the government. 
The Secretary of State heads the U.S. Department of State. The Secretary is 
primarily concerned with foreign affairs. He or she is also a member of the President’s 
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Cabinet and the National Security Council. In the succession in the presidential line, the 
Secretary is the highest appointed executive branch official. According to the Department 
of State, the duties of the Secretary of State include the following: The Secretary 
“organizes and supervises the entire United States Department of State and the United 
States Foreign Service.” He or she “advises the President on matters relating to U.S. 
foreign policy, including the appointment of diplomatic representatives to other nations, 
and on the acceptance or dismissal of representatives from other nations.” Also, the 
Secretary “participates in high-level negotiations with other countries, either bilaterally or 
as part of an international conference or organization, or appoints representatives to do so. 
This includes the negotiation of international treaties and other agreements.” And, he or 
she is “responsible for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of 
interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas.”35 Overall, it can be said 
that the Secretary of State—who is responsible for the management of the diplomatic 
service of the United States—can have significant influence in the foreign policy making 
process. 
David S. McLellan, in his book about Acheson, states 
in an America in which power was quite capable of corroding the integrity 
of the strongest man, Acheson stood out because he spoke and acted upon 
what his thought and conscience dictated … Until the end he said what he 
believed, no matter who was hurt, including himself. 
This assessment implies that Acheson had a strong position in the Department and 
that his decisions in the policy making process were not ignored. So it can be concluded 
that Acheson was in a situation where the State Department was at the center of forming 
a U.S. grand strategy, and as the head of the Department, he had the power—as well as 
the responsibility—to influence the decisions being made. 
B. ACHESON’S INFLUENCE ON THE U.S. CHINA POLICY 
Though the Secretary of State and the State Department itself are recognized as 
having the duties and the responsibilities listed previously, it is difficult to assume that 
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the policy decisions are entirely determined by him or her. It is the Secretary’s task to 
provide the President of the United States with advice to make the major policy decisions. 
So, as an advisor on foreign policy, it is important to have a close relationship with the 
chief executive in order to make sure that the recommendations are properly implemented 
in policy making. If there is distrust and disagreement in the relationship of the president 
and the Secretary of State, it can be easily assumed that the Secretary’s influence in the 
policy-making process or in the administration can be disregarded.  
James Chace has asserted that Acheson’s presence, as the head of the State 
Department, was dominant in the Truman administration. Truman rarely questioned 
advice from the Secretary of State, and no other department in the administration had the 
influence that could be compared with Acheson in shaping foreign policy.  
No secretary of state in this century possessed the power Truman granted 
to Acheson. … In the end, his actions not only defined American power 
and purpose in the postwar era, but also laid the foundations for American 
predominance at the end of the twentieth century and beyond.36 
Acheson’s influence, particularly on U.S. China policy during the Truman 
Administration, can be noticed in comments from the following literature. Nancy 
Bernkopf Tucker states that Acheson was the center of forming America’s China policy. 
The white paper—which was the main framework for the future China policy—was 
based on Acheson’s developing thoughts on the future of U.S.-China relations. 37 
Moreover, she states that Acheson, while inviting other perspectives on the China issue, 
did not necessarily use the opinions of others. This meant that as Secretary of State, 
Acheson was confident in his decisions in the process of forming a China policy.38 
Acheson’s influence in the foreign policy-making circle is also emphasized. 
During the tenures of James Byrnes and George Marshall, Acheson had served as Acting 
Secretary of State, and with his intimate relationship with President Truman, he had the 
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most influence in shaping foreign policy,39 which made him “virtually the president’s 
only advisor on international relations.”40  This left Acheson in control of the China 
policy—with the lack of general interest and the confusing situation of the civil war 
between the Nationalist and the Communist groups, Congress “left the White House and 
the State Department in almost complete control of Chinese affairs”.41 Tucker also states 
that Truman trusted Acheson’s decisions and rarely intervened, particularly in the China 
policy, and gave the State Department a considerable amount of freedom in U.S. foreign 
policy.42 This meant that Acheson, with his unmatchable influence within the presidential 
advisor circle, was the key factor in forming the China policy. 
An example of Acheson’s influence regarding the China policy can be identified 
during the events of the detention of Consul General Ward in Mukden. With the 
maltreatment of a U.S. citizen by the Communist Chinese officials, Tucker states that 
Truman probably would have decided to block the Chinese coast as he had threatened 
before. Also, he would have vetoed Ambassador Stuart’s visit to Beijing to meet with the 
Communist leaders if not for the State Department.43 Regarding this situation Ronald L. 
McGlothlen illustrates the event in more detail. He states that after knowing Truman’s 
anger with Communist China, Acheson and his advisors hurried over to the White House 
and convinced the president that the situation in China would be resolved, and that the 
main goal of the United States was to divide the developing relationship between the 
PRC and the Soviet Union. Truman recalled his idea of a blockade and followed 
Acheson’s advice.44  
Though the domestic political circles frequently attacked the administration’s 
mild attitude toward the Communist Chinese regime, Truman trusted Acheson and his 
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policy towards China in general. McGlothlen emphasizes that Truman referred to 
Acheson as his “number one brain man”45 and focuses on his special relationship with 
the president and the influence he had on his subordinates. Acheson had the respect of 
Dean Rusk, Lucius Battle, and Max Bishop—his closest advisors—who recall that the 
Secretary was a man who received genuine support of his decisions from the 
Department.46 Acheson’s decisions on the China policy had substantial influence within 
the political chain, from top to bottom. 
So, as the head of a distinguished department in a time when its role was 
emphasized for the formation of a U.S. grand strategy, including a U.S. China policy, and 
with the close relationship with the president, both personally and officially, Dean 
Acheson is a valid individual for examination in the research. This thesis will be based on 
the assumption that Acheson’s influence in the process of forming a U.S. China policy 
during the Truman administration was greater than any other decision maker within the 
political circle, and try to assess the what image he had of China, which could have 
affected his decisions.  
C. CONTENT ANALYSIS 
The definition of content analysis, according to Ole R. Holsti, is “a technique for 
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics 
of messages.”47 It is a technique or method of analysis which has been widely used in 
many sectors48 and is usually used for the generation of data in the testing of one’s 
hypotheses. 
The validity of the content analysis method is emphasized in an attempt to search 
for other scientific methods in psychological research—methods being usually borrowed 
from positivistic science. Robert Faux, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, states 
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that psychology has been using positivistic science methods in its studies. More recently, 
however, psychologists who use qualitative research methodologies are increasing. In 
studies of cognitive psychology, the method of content analysis is being used to research 
cases of verbal and literal responses to problem solving tasks. Faux conducted a case 
study to describe the uses of content analysis and interviews with participants in 
educational psychology research. The purpose of the research was to examine the 
application of existing knowledge of undergraduate students in case study problems and 
to analyze what the students’ emotional responses were about the use of case studies as 
an instructional tool. As a research method, content analysis of the students’ written 
responses to cases and individual interviews were conducted. In the conclusion, Faux 
stated that in research that examines the subjects’ analysis of case studies and their 
emotions, content analysis and interviews were the best method.49 
Other than the psychological sector, various forms of content analysis have been 
used in political research. It is widely used in the study of international politics, including 
foreign policy. 50  Although it has been frequently used, content analysis in political 
research, like any other method, has not been able to avoid criticism. The general 
weakness of content analysis is that it is partly limited in the depth of its study. As the 
study of content analysis is based primarily on the communication means of people, it 
cannot accurately conclude on the inner thoughts of the presenter. Another weakness is 
that it can be questioned for its objectivity. As with any research, the data that is needed 
for the assessment is collected by a human researcher. The researcher is required to have 
a general position in the process of collecting data. The data can be interpreted in another 
way to other researchers, as it is the choice of an individual. 
However, those who support content analysis feel that the advantages of the 
method outweigh its deficiencies. A general point that scholars make for the use of 
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content analysis is based upon the fact that most of the research in politics must be 
observed from the outside and be initiated after the event has taken place. Since there are 
few occasions and it is less likely for a researcher to observe directly the development of 
events, the analysis of certain individuals tends to be subjected to content analysis. The 
method provides the researcher a more logical and objective way to assess the facts about 
events, the environment, and the images and perceptions of individuals to use in the 
study.51 
The content analysis method shows another advantage in analyzing past 
statements of individuals. Researchers who prefer the content analysis method argue that 
it is relatively more objective than the data that is acquired with a subject or individual 
who is aware that the information he or she presents has the potential of being used in a 
research. It is also generally felt by many that written statements have more restraint on 
the speaker and is more candid than other types of data. Any type of communication that 
is written tends to be formal and more sincere than spoken ones. Also it applies more 
pressure to the writer than spoken data; because of that, the writer is expected to be more 
responsible for what he or she has stated. This observation is supported by many 
journalists and reporters who often request that individuals write an official statement of 
their oral comments.52 
With these points in mind, it can be said that content analysis is a valid 
methodology and is qualified to complement the traditionally used methods in analyzing 
images and perceptions of individuals. Despite the controversy, researchers who use the 
content analysis method argue that when using the same data, the method advances other 
traditional methods which do not provide a more objective quality in the analysis of the 
data or the system. 
David G. Winter and Abigail J. Stewart illustrate the uses of the content analysis 
method to assess personal characteristics and belief systems—including perceptions of a 
specific subject. They note that the method is systematic and objective in studying both 
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written and transcribed oral material.53 While laying out the advantages of the method in 
analyzing an individual, the study presents a noticeable example in the use of content 
analysis. It uses the method to analyze President Nixon’s behavior and motives using his 
speeches before and after the Watergate scandal. Before the scandal, the authors assess 
that Nixon had more power in his tone than after the incident. They conclude that the 
content analysis method is relevant and useful in testing hypotheses of political leaders 
and how they think and act.  
Hermann also uses the content analysis to measure personal characteristics and 
beliefs. In one study, she examines the statements of Congressmen during a floor debate 
in the U.S. House of Representatives, in an attempt to find two specific beliefs—
humanitarian ideology and orientation toward international involvement—of the political 
leaders. 54  Using the content analysis method, Hermann tries to identify important 
characteristics—one of which is optimism. The optimism factor that Hermann refers to is 
“a general expectation of good and favorable outcome in the future and a general 
satisfaction with the present.” 55  It also means that “the optimistic individual makes 
positive references to how things are at present and has positive expectations for the 
future.”56 This indicates that the emotional state or an attitude of an individual in regard 
to a specific subject will be expressed in his or her statements.  
In analyzing leadership personality and foreign policy behavior, Hermann again 
emphasizes the use of the content analysis method. She illustrates the difficulties of 
assessing personal characteristics and images of a subject. Because the usual way to 
evaluate an individual is by personality tests and interviews, and since access to heads of 
state for these purposes is extremely difficult, another means of assessing personal views 
is required. Content analysis—though indirect—provides a way to examine political 
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leaders without their awareness that they are under examination, which promotes the 
objectivity of the data collected. Also, it provides a method to measure personal beliefs 
and views of deceased political individuals, since they are no longer subject to live 
interviews.57  
Another interesting example of the use of content analysis is William Eckhardt 
and Ralph White’s test of Urie Bronfenbrenner’s mirror-image theory of the Cold War. In 
an attempt to prove the hypothesis that there existed a “mirror image” in the mutual 
perceptions of the United States and Russia, and that the image represented distortion by 
the other side, the authors use Kennedy and Khrushchev’s speeches to examine the image 
one had against the other state. By using a content analysis method, the content of the 
speeches was categorized into 31 values—including “aggression”—of the speaker. It then 
emphasized the most frequent value that was identified in Kennedy and Khrushchev’s 
statements regarding each state.58 In the conclusion, Eckhardt and White state that they 
found that by analyzing public speeches made by the two leaders, the “mirror-image” 
theory was partially confirmed. This indicates also indicates that the content analysis 
method is valid to assess a political leader’s personally held image of another state. 
This thesis will focus mainly on the use of the content analysis method in Myron 
Greenberg’s dissertation on the position of Secretary of State and individuals who have 
held that position—Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Dean Rusk—and their belief 
systems. In an attempt to measure various elements of the former Secretaries’ belief 
systems, Greenberg uses content analysis to identify what the individuals thought about a 
subject. In the category of the Secretaries’ view of the adversary, the author emphasizes 
the question of what the image of the enemy is. He states that it is important because of 
the “structural interrelationship existing within the belief system between the actor’s 
perception of the nature of politics and his image of the enemy.”59 With the content 
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analysis method, the image of the enemy is described by analyzing public speeches of the 
Secretaries, and the evolution of those images over time is also identified.60 Greenberg 
also includes external factors—such as international incidents that could have affected 
the decision-making process—as variables in his study. He provides graphs such as 
infiltration rates of the North Vietnamese Army and the American response to show that 
despite provocations from the enemy, there was a point where the U.S. response rate was 
lower than the threats.61 This indicates that the image of the enemy that was held by the 
decision maker had shifted at a point due to a certain event.  
A similar use of the content analysis method can be noticed in Jerry Gilbert’s 
dissertation, “John Foster Dulles’ Perceptions of the People’s Republic of China: A Study 
of Belief Systems and Perception in the Analysis of Foreign Policy-Making.”62 Although 
the external variables that could have affected Dulles’s perception of the PRC are not 
included, the study presents statistical data of the expressions that are used to describe 
Communist China. He presents analyzed data—which are in numerical form—to identify 
the top terms of expressions that indicate the a particular image that Dulles had of China 
during his term as Secretary of State. Also, it can be noticed that there were radical 
changes in the pattern of the numerical results, which later Gilbert explained by applying 
certain events that could have influenced the China image.63 
This thesis is based on the assumption that a particular individual, Dean Acheson 
had the most influence in shaping the U.S. China policy during the early Cold War period. 
Knowing the personal characteristics—especially Acheson’s view of Communist 
China—helps researchers to understand and analyze why a certain policy was made. As 
illustrated above, content analysis is an appropriate method to know an individual’s 
personally held image or perception of a subject, particularly when the individual is 
deceased. With the advantages of content analysis and its use in pre-existing studies, this 
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thesis will use the method—similar to Greenberg and Gilbert’s analyses—to test the 
hypothesis that Acheson’s image of Communist China changed after the Chinese 
intervention in the Korean War.  
D. USING DICTION AS A TOOL FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 
In the previous section, the research discussed the validity of the content analysis 
method to identify certain images of political leaders. Examples of content analysis used 
in analyzing certain images of the enemy can be found in Greenberg’s64 and Gilbert’s65 
research. While both of the authors show general and logical data, both tend to lack in 
presenting more solid and objective evidence to support their arguments. In analyzing the 
enemy images held by Acheson, Dulles, and Rusk, Greenberg presents a rather 
quantitative method—such as counting pre-categorized terms that indicated the “enemy.” 
Though he supports the results with historical events that may have affected the choice in 
words used to describe a certain subject, one cannot but question the accuracy of the 
collected data. Questions arise whether the author actually did count the words without 
human error. The same question applies to Gilbert’s research, which applied a rather 
complex Evaluative Assertion Analysis method. At the time the dissertation was written, 
a computer program to aid in the analysis of this method was in development, but Gilbert 
sought to choose the manual way. As the equations and the length of the contents were 
long, and that required a great deal of time, there can be questions about the reliability of 
the data. These doubts about the accuracy and the reliability of the data lead to the use of 
computer-assisted text analysis programs in this thesis. 
As sources of texts—especially electronic texts—are becoming more available 
and easy to access, computer-assisted text analysis has become an important method for 
discovering meaning. Computer-assisted text and content analysis has been constantly 
evolving and modified to be used for a broad spectrum of purposes—from educational 
research to multimedia applications. Efforts to improve the validity and effectiveness in 
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the application of content analysis are continuously being made—testing old and existing, 
as well as other techniques to discover flaws and factors to improve. Moreover, with the 
continuing advancement in technology, the established methods of the computer-assisted 
content analysis are being upgraded and tested every day. 
In an article about the application of computer-assisted text analysis, Melina 
Alexa states:  
The existing model of assigning properties (categories), which are 
heuristic rather than conceptually based, to word forms and counting 
frequencies of occurrence of these properties is alone not sufficient for the 
variety of research questions and application contexts of text analysis. 
Furthermore, it has been often demonstrated that content cannot be 
analyzed without taking into account the general context of situation a text 
belongs to.66 
It is obvious that even the computer-assisted content analysis has limited abilities. 
Although, quantitative methods—such as counting frequent use of particular terms—have 
proven to be useful, a qualitative method in content analysis can be said to be more valid. 
Also, manual analysis of the situation in which the content is derived has to be 
considered—such as seen in Greenberg’s research. This thesis will use a computer-aided 
text analysis program, DICTION 7.0, which uses a qualitative as well as quantitative 
method to evaluate the statements of Dean Acheson. The developers of the DICTION 
software describe the program thusly: 
DICTION is a computer-aided text analysis program that uses a series of 
dictionaries to search a passage for five semantic features—Activity, 
Optimism, Certainty, Realism and Commonality—as well as thirty-five 
sub-features. DICTION uses predefined dictionaries and can use up to 
thirty custom dictionaries built with words that the user has defined, such 
as topical or negative words, for particular research needs.67 
The results from analyzing the data are provided in a numeric form for statistical 
analysis. The results can be seen in a form of raw totals, standardized scores, word and 
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character counts and percentages. With this process, researchers can use the program to 
analyze content in various ways. Also, the results of the program are based on the built-in 
database that has pre-analyzed 50,000 tests. Researchers can apply the data in a pre-fixed 
framework that is provided, which includes general speeches, political speeches, political 
debates, newspaper editorials, business reports, scientific documents, television scripts, 
and telephone conversations to get a comparative view of results of the research.68 
DICTION has been used in many books, dissertations, and other research in 
various fields. In the social science sector, Hart has used the program to analyze the 
statements and official announcements of presidents and other political leaders.69 Davis 
and Gardner, in their research of leaders’ use of charismatic rhetoric, provide a good 
description and valid reason for the use of the program. They start by promoting the use 
of the computerized content analysis method by stating the methodological benefits. First, 
with a mixed method of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the method provides 
reliable results. Second, the coding method is standardized with the systematic and 
reliable computer program. Also, because it is a digital program, it has little chance of 
neglecting details that a human researcher might. They used the DICTION program for 
two reasons. DICTION was specifically designed to analyze the rhetoric of political 
leaders—President George W. Bush, in their case—and because it provided an advanced 
level of comparison and continuity between current events and relevant studies. Also, 
DICTION has several special features, including various dictionaries designed to analyze 
a text, and using statistical weighting in treating homographs as an effort to partially 
account for the context of the words, and allowing the researcher to create a custom 
dictionary for specific purposes in the study.70 There are many other studies that have 
used DICTION as a tool in content analysis which have a respected reputation.71  
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Although DICTION cannot directly tell the researcher what an individual thinks 
on a specific subject, it provides numerical results of certain features such as optimism, 
positivity, present concern, past concern, and aggression that are identified from the 
content being analyzed. It gives analysts data to compare statements of various political 
leaders about a certain subject—for example, comparing the “Aggression” scores from 
statements of individuals A, B, and C, regarding incident D. More importantly, it 
provides data to compare statements regarding a certain subject—for example, comparing 
the “Optimism” scores of statements A, B, and C, regarding the subject D. The 
comparisons allow the researcher to find patterns in the various statements about certain 
events. 
As the goal of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that Acheson’s image of PRC 
changed after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, DICITON 7.0 will be used to 
analyze the tenor of various statements of the Secretary regarding Communist China. The 
results will be examined in an attempt to identify distinctive patterns and changes in 
Acheson’s statements throughout a certain period. By applying Hermann’s description of 
the optimism factor in a statement—”a general expectation of good and favorable 
outcome in the future and a general satisfaction with the present”72—the thesis will use 
the “Optimism” results of DICTION to evaluate Acheson’s attitude towards Communist 
China. Also, applying one of Eckhardt and White’s values—the aggressiveness in a 
statement—the “Aggression” results will be used. The relationship between a subject of 
hostility and a tone of aggression in a statement regarding the subject, as well as the 
relationship with the tone of optimism, will be discussed in the DICTION result section. 
This thesis assumes that the “Optimism” score will decrease and the “Aggression” 
score will increase as Acheson perceived Communist China as a hostile enemy—which 
will be expressed in his statements. The scores are examined in an attempt to find certain 
points of radical changes in pattern. The points are then compared with a timeframe of 
U.S.-China relations to identify which event could have caused the shift in Acheson’s 
rhetoric—his personally held image of Communist China. Overall, the scores act as a tool 
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of measurement in the process. By using a computer-assisted text analysis program, the 
thesis obtains more objective data—with less human error—to analyze, which in turn 
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III. ANALYSIS OF ACHESON’S STATEMENTS 
In this chapter, the study tests the hypothesis that the leadership—represented by 
Dean Acheson—adopted a hostile image of Communist China after the Chinese 
intervention in the Korean War. Statements regarding the Chinese Communist Party will 
be analyzed with a content analysis tool—DICITON 7.0—and a detailed explanation for 
the results are presented. A timeline of U.S.-China relations is illustrated to explain that 
despite indicators of tension between the United States and the PRC, the policy makers 
did little to prevent confrontation because of the pre-existing images—which later 
changed after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War—that interfered with the 
decision-making process.  
First, the chapter describes the collected data. The intent of this description is to 
inform and argue that the data collected is not biased in favor of the researcher. Using the 
DICTION program and manually analyzing the statements of Acheson, selective data—
in which Communist China may be mentioned in certain terms the researcher prefers—
will compromise the results. As mentioned earlier, this is one of the problems identified 
in the use of the content analysis method. The chapter also presents that the data is 
generally collected from a source with authority and reliability, and indicates that the data 
is not affected by an individual with a biased opinion.  
Next, it is essential to point out the events that could have affected Acheson’s 
image of China. Since the cognition of a subject consistently evolves and changes by 
being influenced by external events, Acheson’s perception of the PRC could have been 
altered by the events that were related to China. Interactions that could be generally 
identified as negative in the relations between the two countries are presented as points of 
the change in Acheson’s perception of China. 
After identifying the main points in history between the two countries, results of 
DICTION 7.0 analysis of the statements made by Acheson is presented. It focuses on the 
aggression and optimism factors of the results that indicate the attitude of the statement—
Acheson, being the presenter of the statement—had on a particular subject—Communist 
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China. The aggression element represents the tone of voice when Acheson referred to the 
“Communist China” or “Chinese Communist,” as well as the sentence itself. The 
program analyzes the words that are used to describe, modify, and define Communist 
China, and provides the results in numerical form. The optimism element of the program 
provides the results according to the same process. 
Numeric results in analyzing a statement is difficult to evaluate—there is no 
standard to compare the data with, when analyzing one individual. This is the reason why 
many studies analyze and compare the statements of multiple leaders regarding a similar 
subject.73 For example, they provide analysis such as “the aggressiveness of a certain 
subject of leader A is higher than that of leader B.” Although this is an effective way to 
assess an individual’s image of a subject, this thesis compares the results throughout a set 
period. It focuses on the changes in patterns in the results of the analysis.  
Then the thesis takes into account the events that could have had negative effects 
on the perception of China, and analyzes the statements regarding the events or China 
itself. The main point of this process is to reinforce the mechanical characteristics of the 
automated analysis of the statements. The program being used in the research—
DICTION 7.0—can only analyze the statements themselves. It does not have the ability 
to consider external factors that could affect the subject. For example, let’s imagine that 
an individual A always called an individual B by the term C—with C being a positive 
term. After an agreement, with no change in the relationship between the two, A called B 
a D—imagining that D is a negative term—for a period. The automated program 
processes this information without consideration of the agreement, and presents a result 
that could conclude that A has negative feelings towards B. Since the content analysis 
method—DICTION 7.0 results in this case—helps identify changes in tone and language 
but cannot explain the reasons why those changes occurred, this thesis provides the 
analysis—an explanation—tied to the events.74 So, in order to minimize the weakness of  
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the automated system, the researcher must identify changes in terms or a specific tone 
that concern China, while assessing the external factors that could have had effect on the 
individual.  
After identifying the numeric changes in the results, along with the explanations 
of the results from the manual analysis of the statements, these results are compared with 
the three possible turning points identified in the events of U.S.-China relations. If the 
hypothesis is correct, the DICTION results in the “Aggression” factor will significantly 
increase, while the “Optimism” factor decreases after the point of the Chinese 
intervention in the Korean War. Also, to support the numeric results, the manual analysis 
provides significant changes in terms that describe the Chinese Communists. Other 
results, such as a constant increase in the “Aggression” factor and decrease in the 
“Optimism” factor indicate that Acheson developed a hostile image of Communist China, 
along with the rising tensions in the U.S-China relations, proving the hypothesis wrong. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
For a rigorous evaluation, the content analysis should analyze all publicly 
available statements and documents in which Dean Acheson referred to China. Such a 
collection of statements should address numerous possible objections to use of the 
content analysis method. The use of all public statements results in the cancelling out of 
intentionally misleading statements. It is also felt that highly placed and publicly exposed 
figures such as Acheson tend to be trapped by their public statements. Even though a 
public statement may not reflect the true attitude or perception of the speaker, his/her 
actions will be influenced by the statements made.  
The use of public statements rather than private ones may raise questions of the 
originality of the content. For example, statements of Acheson in a press conference 
would more likely represent his own attitude regarding China than formal speeches that 
are written in advance—with consideration and predictions about the reactions of the 
listeners. Regarding this problem, an interesting research by Jonathan Renshon of 
Harvard University supports the use of public statements in content analysis. Renshon 
states that content analysis has relied more on the analysis of public speeches than private 
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ones. This indicates that the use of the method is continuously being challenged by those 
who argue that the speeches being analyzed “represent attempts at deception, persuasion, 
or impression management.”75 Renshon refutes these charges by comparing analysis of 
President John F. Kennedy’s public and private statements in the summer of 1962, of 
which the results are similar to those found later in this research. The study answers the 
main question, “Do leaders’ public speeches convey their actual beliefs?”76 By using 
analysis programs—Profiler Plus v. 5.7.0 and Verbs In Context System (VICS)—the 
study presents analysis results of six public speeches of Kennedy regarding foreign policy 
issues and transcripts of privately recorded meetings the president had with his advisors 
on the same issues.77 As the results showed that there was no specific distinction in the 
comparison, it indicated that using either public or private statements of political leaders 
does not affect the outcome of the analysis—emphasizing the validity of the use of public 
statements.78 
Another advantage of using public statements of Acheson for the research is that 
they represent the collective beliefs of the foreign policy-making leadership. Although 
this thesis is testing the hypothesis of Acheson’s shift in his view of Communist China, it 
would be a more valuable research to test the general idea of the State Department 
itself—including the White House. Also, as Acheson’s influence on the China policy was 
emphasized previously, this study assumes that while the statements were censored by 
various factors, the factors themselves were influenced by the Secretary’s ideas—which 
meant that the statements are valid as his own. 
This data collection procedure requires finding all assertions made by Acheson 
regarding the People’s Republic of China. As the research presented in this thesis is 
limited in scale, and destined to exclude some of the statements, this research centers its 
collected data on one specific source. The primary source used to collect the statements 
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made by Acheson is The Department of State Bulletin. Its goal is to provide the public 
and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field 
of foreign relations—especially on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House 
and the Department of State, and statements and addresses made by the president and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of the department. It publishes articles on 
international affairs and the functions of the Department of State.79 The Bulletin qualifies 
as a representative sample in such statements.  
B. TIMELINE OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
Because the goal of this thesis is to identify the turning point in the U.S. view of 
China during the early Cold War period, it is important to understand the basic 
parameters of the relevant history. As stated earlier and used in Greenberg’s dissertation 
in assessing the enemy images of the former Secretaries of State, it is imperative know 
the conditions of which the statements are being made. While multiple events can have 
absolutely no effect on an individual’s perception of a certain subject, a single incident 
can dramatically change the entire belief system. Therefore, prior to the analysis of 
Acheson’s statements, it is important to know the possible events that could have affected 
his personally held image of China. The following discussion identifies certain points in 
early U.S.-China relations that could have caused a hostile image of Communist China.  
Robert Blum provides a good summary of the U.S.-China relations during the 
Truman administration. He emphasizes three important points in the relationship in which 
the tensions start to escalate—the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China; the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Security; and the Chinese 
intervention in the Korean War. 
In the statement Mao made on June 30, 1949—”On the People’s Democratic 
Dictatorship”—he defined a policy of leaning to one side, implying the Soviets. “Not 
only in China but throughout the world,” he said, “one must lean either to imperialism or 
to socialism. There is no exception. Neutrality is merely a camouflage; a third road does 
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not exist.”80 After the speech the United States Department of State released a famous 
document called the “White Paper” arguing that the fall of the Chinese Nationalists was 
caused by the incapability of the Nationalist regime itself. This document was an attempt 
to explain and to answer to questions and criticisms of other political leaders in the 
administration. While the U.S.’s China policy was continuously being debated in 
Washington, on October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed.81 
Note that before the release of the “White Paper,” there was pre-existing tension 
between the United States and Communist China. The event when the Chinese 
Communist officials accused and charged U.S. Consul General Angus Ward of 
espionage—which resulted in the expulsion of the General and his staff—contributed to 
the potential of conflict along with other accusations of U.S. citizens in China.82 After the 
official establishment of the Communist regime, the PRC continued to demonstrate 
hostile actions and publish aggressive statements to the United States. U.S. citizens in 
China were being detained for the Communist government’s refusal to recognize 
departing visas. Also, anti-American propaganda reached its peak during the process and 
gradually conditions for the lean toward the Soviets increased.83 
Communist China’s relationship with the Soviet Union hit its peak when the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Security was signed on February 14, 
1950. This treaty was a public declaration that the PRC stood by the Soviet side. The 
main agreement of the treaty was that the two governments would jointly carry out all 
necessary means to prevent an imperialistic confrontation by the Japanese or any other 
external forces that were related to Japan. If either was in a state of war with Japan or its 
allies, the other had the obligation to intervene and give military and other assistance. 
After the North Koreans invaded the South in June 25, 1950, the issue of “who 
lost China” started to be less of an interest to the leadership and public. While the 
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situation in Korea was being gradually contained by the UN forces, the Chinese 
Communist regime started to warn the United States of the possibility of its own 
intervention. There were threats and initial actions that signaled if the allied forces 
crossed the 38
th
 parallel, the Chinese Red Army would intervene. Nonetheless United 
Nations troops crossed the 38
th
 parallel, leading the Chinese forces to cross the Yalu 
River.84 This act and subsequent actions—such as China refusing proposals to end the 
fighting—led to the hardening of the U.S. position in accepting the PRC to the United 
Nations. Also, Communist China was condemned as an aggressor by the UN and began 
to be perceived as an aggressive imperial power that had a negative influence in the 
world. 
Blum states that at the time Washington’s attention was mainly focused on 
Europe. The leadership had no intention of putting U.S. efforts into the Chinese civil war. 
The U.S. position in Asia was that, with the troops in Japan and Okinawa, and with close 
its relationship with the Philippines, the United States did not need to waste resources in 
the region. Also, the leadership thought that the Chinese Communists were going to be 
occupied mainly with resolving issues in mainland China.  
Blum ends the section by quoting Acheson and adding that,  
It is clear in retrospect that while we “let the dust settle” and attempted to 
limit our commitments in Asia, we did not accurately foresee the 
consequences of what had happened in China and underestimated the 
ability of the Chinese Communists to unify and mobilize the country and 
infuse its people and policies with hostility to the United States. We 
vaguely hoped that the Chinese people would in time part ways with 
international communism, which was then seen as being tightly controlled 
and directed from Moscow, but not many Americans foresaw the 
important and distinctive role that Communist China itself would soon 
play in Asia and the world.85 
As observed earlier, the development of the U.S.-Communist China conflict can 
be divided into three sections. The conditions for the ultimate confrontation were shaped 
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by the position that China had between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the 
United States was forming a grand strategy for the battle against communism, the 
Chinese were gradually starting to lean toward the Soviet side. This research divides the 
U.S.-China relations into four periods with the points cited previously. The first period is 
before the proclamation of the PRC; the second, prior to the Sino-Soviet Treaty; the third 
is up until the Chinese intervention in the Korean War; and the last is after the 
intervention. Acheson’s statements are analyzed across these four time frames. 
C. ANALYSIS OF ACHESON’S STATEMENTS USING DICTION 7.0 
This section presents the analysis of Acheson’s statements provided by the 
computer-aided text analysis program DICTION 7.0. The main goal of this process is to 
identify a change in the “Aggression” and “Optimism” factor scores of the results. As 
noted in the advantages of the computer-aided content analysis program, the results are 
also used to reinforce the manual assessments of Acheson’s statements which can be 
subjective—that is, affected by a biased perception of the researcher.  
Before analyzing the statements with DICTION, the reasons for selecting the 
factors—”Aggression” and “Optimism”—must be addressed. In the previous chapter, the 
two factors were mentioned as having been used to analyze enemy images held by 
political leaders—optimism used in Hermann’s study86 and aggression used in Eckhardt 
and White’s evaluations.87 Besides these factors’ use in other researches, it is important 
to know the relationship between the two factors in statements and Acheson’s hostile 
image of China.  
Elton McNeil describes a good example of personal reactions to subjects that are 
perceived as hostile. He states that an individual will become increasingly target-oriented 
and use communication of threat and aggression when hostility is recognized.88 The signs 
of hostility will be perceived as threats to the individual, who will first respond with 
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countering threats—which will be recognized in the verbal content of the individual. 
Then the individual will find allies to rally against the hostile subject and again target it 
with aggressive forms of communication.89  Though these results were derived from 
observing a group of seventy minors, McNeil connects his findings to international 
relations, in which he identifies similar behaviors of political leaders and their 
statements.90 
Another reaction to hostility can be found in a study measuring interstate affect. 
William Dixon presents examples of President Reagan, National Security Advisor 
Richard Allen, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s statements regarding the Soviet 
Union. He states that like all social interactions, foreign policy behaviors—especially 
statements of political leaders—exhibit content of expressing an evaluation of a particular 
subject. If the subject is considered hostile and unfriendly, the leader will state negative 
or aggressive terms and expressions indicating his feelings.91 A statement by President 
Reagan in a press conference charging the Soviets with reserving “the right to commit 
any crime, to lie, to cheat”92 should be noticed.  
As for optimism, Hermann presents the use of the factor in the analysis of 
statements. The optimistic tone in a statement indicates that the speaker is expecting a 
good and favorable outcome of the future and is satisfied with the present state. If an 
individual’s attitude is positive about a particular subject, the statements he or she makes 
will be in an optimistic tone.93 
So, in this thesis, the verbal tone of aggression in the statements indicates the 
level of hostility Acheson perceived of Communist China and the optimistic tone, the 
opposite. As the study is limited to one individual, the results of the “Aggression” and 
“Optimism” scores will not be compared to a set standard, such as scores of other 
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political figures. Instead, it focuses on the pattern of the results, looking for distinctive 
changes in the scores. Also, though not a set standard, the score of every statement is 
compared with the overall average of the scores to roughly identify the pattern. The 
results of Acheson’s statements are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1.   The Statements of Dean Acheson and DICTION 7.0 Analysis Results. 
 
 







Scale: 0 to 100 
1 1949. 8. 4 
Basic Principles of U.S. Policy  
Toward the Far East 
5.60 51.93 
2 1949. 10. 26 
Chinese Communists Refuse Exit Visa  
for American Military Attaché 
6.63 47.83 
3 1949. 11. 23 
Angus Ward Released by the Communists 
(Secretary Acheson Personal Letter to Thirty  
Nations) 
5.18 49.94 
4 1949. 11. 30 
U.S. Protests to Chinese Communists in  
Smith-Bender Case 
3.56 50.12 
5 1950. 1. 12 
Crisis in Asia, “An Examination of U.S. Policy” 
(Made before the national press club in  
Washington) 
4.54 50.24 
6 1950. 2. 8 Peace Goal Demands Firm Resolve 4.61 47.97 
7 1950. 2. 16 
Total Diplomacy to Strengthen U.S. Leadership for 
Human Freedom 





8 1950. 3. 15 
United States Policy Toward Asia 
An address delivered before the Commonwealth Club 
of California at San Francisco, CA 
5.41 50.70 
9 1950. 3. 31 Soviets Exploit Sinkiang oil and Mineral Resources 3.95 48.08 
10 1950. 3. 31 Evacuation of Americans From Shanghai 2.06 48.94 
11 1950. 7. 18 
Prime Minister Nehru’s Appeal To Settle Korean 
Problem by Admitting Chinese 
Communists to U.N. Rejected (Message 
of Acheson) 
6.99 52.37 
12 1950. 9. 10 
Foreign Policies Toward Asia 
A television interview with secretary Acheson 
6.30 50.26 
13 1950. 11. 15 
United States Foreign Policy 
Extemporaneous remarks made before a National 
Conference on Foreign Policy held in the Department 
of State at Washington 
5.19 50.61 
14 1950. 11. 29 
The Strategy of Freedom 
Broadcast from Washington to the National Council of 
Churches of Christ in the United States 
19.13 50.99 
15 1951. 1. 17 Chinese Communists Reject Cease-Fire Proposal 15.39 48.73 
16 1951. 4. 18 
Our far Eastern Policy, “Debate, Decision, and 
Action” 
Made before the Women’s National Press Club at 
Washington 
9.74 52.32 
17 1951. 6. 1 
Peace or War and the Survival of Human Freedom 
Made before the Senate Armed Services and the 
Foreign Relations Committees on the MacArthur 
Hearings 
22.56 47.76 
18 1951. 6. 29 
An Estimate of the Present World Situation 
A stenographic transcript of remarks made off the 




The average of the “Aggression” score was 10.45 and the “Optimism” score was 
49.16 throughout the analyzed period. From the results, one can notice that there is a 
significant shift in the “Aggression” scores after the statement made on November 29, 
1950, though it is difficult to notice a change in the “Optimism” scores. A detailed 
analysis of the results is presented after the possible explanations for the pattern of the 
results. Since there is no standard score against which to compare whether Acheson was 
relatively aggressive or optimistic to the Chinese Communist, this thesis sets the standard 
score to the average calculated in Table 1. If Acheson’s “Aggression” score was lower 
than 10.45, it would indicate that he did not think of Communist China as hostile in his 
statement. If it was above the average it would indicate the opposite. The same logic will 
apply to the “Optimism” score.  
book publishers 
19 1951. 11. 13 
Representation of Communist China in the U. N. 
Made before the U.N. General .Assembly at Paris 
24.17 50.27 
20 1951. 12. 30 
A Trial Balance of U.S. Foreign Policy in 1951 
Made before the Jewish War Veterans at New York 
19.20 49.88 
21 1952. 3. 13 
Building Collective Strength Through The Mutual 
Security Program 
9.86 53.13 
22 1952. 7. 16 Communist Assertion in Geneva Conventions 9.45 47.68 
23 1952. 9. 10 Maltreatment of Americans in Communist China 26.09 44.78 
24 1952. 10 .1 Press Conference Statements by Secretary Acheson 12.94 43.82 
25 1952. 10. 24 
The problem of Peace in Korea 
Made before Committee I (Political and Security) of 
the General Assembly 
20.42 47.90 
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D. THE MANUAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATEMENTS 
This section analyzes the statements of Acheson manually. It takes into 
consideration the events that had happened during the period the statements were made—
an attempt to reinforce the defects of the computerized process mentioned earlier. It 
identifies frequently used terms and expressions in certain situations that may help to 
identify the image of China that Acheson had. 
1. Before the Proclamation of the People’s Republic of China 
The analysis of the statements of Acheson starts with the first period as described 
earlier. The first statement of Acheson is the “Basic Principles of U.S. Policy toward the 
Far East.” It was a comprehensive review of United States Far Eastern policy which 
Acheson announced in mid-July 1949. The review clearly indicated that probable 
changes in policy concerning China were under consideration by the policy makers. In 
this Acheson stated that it was a fundamental decision of American policy that the United 
States did not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the 
continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asia area.94 Apparently, the policy review was an 
attempt to make a thorough study of possible policy alternatives in the Far East—in 
particular, China. The main point of the attempt was to sort out difficulties over what 
should be carried out in the United States’ China policy. 
In analyzing the statement, remarks such as “imperialist,” “foreign power,” and 
“clandestine means” can be found describing the Soviet influence. Another interesting 
point to notice can be found in the end of his speech. Acheson stated, 
The Chinese Communists, in attempting to establish a totalitarian 
domination over the Chinese people in the interest of a foreign power and 
in basing this attempt on a willfully distorted concept of the world realities, 
are committing themselves deeply on the basis of unproved assumptions 
as to the extent of their own strength and the nature of the reactions which 
they are bound to provoke in China and elsewhere. The United States, for 
its part, will be prepared to work with the people of China and of every 
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country in Asia to preserve and to promote their true interest, developed as 
they choose and not as dictated by any foreign imperialism.95 
Though Acheson states that the Chinese Communists were “attempting to 
establish a totalitarian domination,” he does not distinguish Communist China from the 
Soviet Union—described in the statement as a foreign power—and questions the 
capabilities of the Chinese Communists. He concludes by stating that the United States is 
ready to help the Chinese—though not the CCP—on the assumption that the Communist 
influence in China would come to an end. He did not specifically state that the United 
States would directly suppress the spreading influence of the Chinese Communist Party. 
Although the study analyzed a single statement, it can be noticed that Acheson used 
ambiguous expressions to address the Chinese Communists—while using the term 
“totalitarian,” there is no expression of conflict or threat. This can explain the relatively 
low score of 5.60 in the DICTION “Aggression” factor. The program did not identify a 
distinctive aggressive tone in Acheson’s statement.  
This indicates that while Acheson had concerns about the future of mainland 
China, he did not have a hostile image of the Chinese Communists. But, as the analysis is 
based on limited data, the thesis will have more focus on the following events that could 
have influenced Acheson’s China image. On August 5, 1949, the Department of State 
published a statement of a new policy towards China—both the Communists and 
Nationalists. It was generally known as the “White Paper.” This publication is identified 
and regarded as the initial step taken by the United States in the withdrawal of support for 
Nationalist China. The White Paper indicated that the Nationalists were responsible for 
the defeat in the Chinese civil war and the leadership in Washington was preparing for 
the collapse of the regime.96  
After the “White Paper” was published it triggered a massive anti-American 
propaganda campaign within mainland China. Mao wrote articles that criticized the U.S. 
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China policy and claimed that the United States was the main enemy of the Chinese 
people and its revolution.97 While hostile movements against the United States were 
rising, the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949. 
2. After the Establishment of the PRC until the Formation of the Sino-
Soviet Alliance 
After the formal establishment of the government, the People’s Republic of China 
requested that it be recognized by the international community as being the sole 
government of Mainland China. The Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, almost 
immediately recognized the Communist regime, including other nations that followed. 
The leaders in Washington were not certain of the outcomes that the Chinese influence 
would have in the Far East. With the some ambiguity, the United States decided to stand 
by and watch the results that the event would have in the international community. After 
the Chinese Communist proclamation, events—such as detainment of U.S. personnel—
triggering tension between the United States and the PRC continued. 
In October 26, 1949, Acheson made a statement announcing the refusal of exit 
visas of an American military attaché by the Chinese Communist government. Gen. 
Robert B. Soule, a military attaché to China was not allowed to depart from Nanking 
until a payment of severance was made. In his statement, Acheson refers to the actions of 
the Communist authorities that prevented the departure as “flimsy.”98 The definition of 
“flimsy” is “lacking in physical strength or substance,” “of inferior materials and 
workmanship,” and “having little worth or plausibility.” 99  Also, Acheson leaves an 
ambiguous ending to the statement by saying, “It is apparent that the failure to issue 
permits was due either to negligence on the part of the Chinese Communist authorities 
concerned or to deliberate discrimination against American officials.”
100
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In the process of forming a China policy, Acheson and the department were 
frequently attacked by political officials for failure to confront the Communists in China. 
There was such constant criticism of the Department’s White Paper that Acheson had to 
refute the charges in a statement.101 In a situation where the policy decisions of the 
Department were being questioned, one would assume that an event like this—the 
mistreatment of U.S. citizens by the PRC officials—would be an adequate opportunity to 
take the advantage by stating or acting aggressively against Communist China in order to 
ease domestic tensions. However, as can be observed in the terms used, Acheson did 
make remarks that indicated an inferior status of the PRC, but did not necessarily make 
aggressive comments and expressions towards the Chinese Communists. Although there 
is a rise in the “Aggression” score of 6.63, it is relatively lower than the average.   
Next the study examines a personal letter by Acheson sent to thirty nations in 
which Acheson’s remarks indicate an inferior image of the PRC. In his letter Acheson 
emphasizes the basic rules of the international community. He uses terms such as “the 
international practice of civilized countries,” and “basic concepts of international 
relations” to point out the absence of general knowledge on the part of the Communist 
Chinese authorities. 102  A similar notion can be found in the statement released on 
November 30, 1949. In informing the public about the detainment of Chief Electrician 
William C. Smith and Master Sergeant Elmer C. Bender, Acheson stated, “The Chinese 
Communist authorities are apparently unaware that the international practice of civilized 
countries for many years has recognized that consuls should be afforded full opportunity 
for the proper conduct of their duties in the protection of their nationals.” 103  This 
statement regarding similar events cited earlier constantly refers to the Communist 
Chinese as ignorant and immature rather than in terms of that indicate aggression—also 
noticed on the “Aggression” score which drops to 3.56 and a rise in the “Optimism” score. 
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In a speech delivered to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, it was 
clearly indicated what Acheson thought about Communist China. He argued that the 
reason for the fall of the Nationalist government was the Nationalists themselves—not 
the strength of the Chinese Communists—and that Communist China was incapable and 
weak. Again, Acheson did not use aggressive terms to describe the PRC in the statement, 
which keeps the “Aggression” score below the average. 
Only one faction, the Communists, up in the hills, ill-equipped, ragged, a 
very small military force, was determinedly opposed to his position. 
…The Communists did not create this. The Communists did not create this 
condition. They did not create this revolutionary spirit. They did not create 
a great force which moved out from under Chiang Kai-Shek. But they 
were shrewd and cunning to mount it, to ride this thing into victory and 
into power.104 
Also, Acheson continues the speech blaming the Russians, that they are 
responsible for the communist movement in China. The Chinese were being deceived by 
the “Communistic concept and techniques that have armed Russian imperialism with a 
new and most insidious weapon of penetration,” and it is the “first and the greatest rule in 
regard to the formulation of American policy toward Asia” to “not undertake to deflect 
from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the 
Chinese people which must develop.”105 He again points out his views of the Chinese 
people and the Soviets planning in a press conference on February 8, 1950.106  
The remarks that place the blame on the Soviets can be found in a meeting at the 
White House in the same month. In his comments on creating situations of strength to 
deal with the Soviet Union, Acheson made a remark about the Chinese Communists 
stating 
The Communists took over China at a ridiculously small cost. What they 
[the Soviet Union] did was to invite some Chinese leaders who were 
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dissatisfied with the way things were going in their country to come to 
Moscow. There, they thoroughly indoctrinated them so that they returned 
to China prepared to resort to any means whatsoever to establish 
Communist control. They were completely subservient to the Moscow 
regime.107 
As seen in this excerpt, Acheson clearly made statements about China that 
described China as inferior to international standards, and emphasized that cunning 
Soviet influence was the main reason for the ignorant Chinese people falling into 
communism. He does not make statements with aggressive terms towards the PRC, 
which indicates that Acheson did not perceive Communist China as hostile. 
The consistency in the remarks of Acheson with regard to the Chinese 
Communists can be explained by two reasons. First, Acheson had not yet established a 
confirmed stance regarding the China policy that the PRC was a hostile state. As the 
United States’ foreign policy was focused on fighting communism, there was a 
possibility that Acheson was mainly interested in tensions with the Soviet Union. The 
terms that were used to describe the Soviet Union support this idea. While addressing the 
Chinese Communists with terms that express their weakness, the Soviet Union was 
defined as “imperialist” and “insidious”108 in character. Acheson also emphasized that the 
primary rule in the formulation of American policy toward Asia was not to abandon the 
needs of the Asian countries under the threat of Soviet influence—specifically pointing 
out China.109 So, while labeling the main adversary as the Soviet Union, there was also a 
possibility that Acheson had hopes that the PRC was not fully committed to Soviet 
Communism, and in the future, would have normal diplomatic relations with the United 
States. Russell D. Buhite supports this idea by arguing that the leadership in Washington 
expected China to play a stabilizing role in Asia, and hoped to establish a pro-American 
China as a counterpoint to the Soviet Union.110 
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Another reason for the constant remarks of Acheson is that he could have simply 
questioned the capabilities of the PRC or the Chinese people in general. Terry Lautz 
states that the American public image of China was that of a somewhat inferior race. 
While the Americans were fascinated by Chinese culture, a “weak, disorganized China 
was treated with disdain.”111 Also the public saw the spread of poverty and disease in 
China which eventually stimulated the formation of an image of the Chinese people as 
benighted and heathen, in need of redemption. Uneducated workers from China who 
came to work at hard labor in gold mines and railroad construction in the western United 
States formed lurid Chinese images in America.”112 Also, before the establishment of the 
communist regime, China had been a colony and been at civil war for a long period. The 
generally poor image of China could have affected Acheson’s cognition process. In his 
statements Communist China is expressed with terms such as “ill-equipped” and 
“ragged.” 113  This could indicate that Acheson actually thought that the Chinese 
Communists were manipulated by the Soviets and did not have the capacity to sustain its 
regime, and it would eventually collapse or cooperate with the superior United States.  
Even after the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, which meant that 
mainland China had become one of the biggest Communist regimes, Acheson constantly 
used terms in official statements with less aggressive attitude. Even after Chinese actions 
that could be interpreted as anti-American, Acheson did not use terms that express 
aggression or protest. The majority of his speeches had a tone that the Chinese people 
were innocently taken over by Soviet Communists, and that the newly formed PRC was 
unaccustomed to the basic rules of the international system. For whatever reason, it can 
be concluded Acheson did not take Communist China seriously. More importantly, this  
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indicated that despite the anti-American movements and the provocations, Acheson did 
not perceive the PRC by a hostile image which can be seen in his statements and scores 
of the DICTION results. 
3. After the Sino-Soviet Treaty to the Chinese Intervention in the 
Korean War 
With the signing of “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance” on February 
14, 1950, the PRC secured a major supporter in the Soviet Union. The two governments 
agreed to preserve the security of both countries, maintain peace in Asia and the World, 
and strengthen their friendship. Also, they agreed to promote the cause of socialist 
construction of the two countries.114 This was a major event that could have affected 
Acheson’s image of a Communist China that was hostile to the United States. 
On March 15, 1950, Acheson delivered a speech about U.S. policy towards Asia. 
While speaking of Soviet intentions in Asia, Acheson states regarding to the Sino-soviet 
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950, that the 
“Chinese people may welcome these promises and assurances. But they will not fail, in 
time, to see where they fall short of China’s real needs and desires. And they will wonder 
about the points upon which the agreements remain silent.”115 
Also, in speaking of fundamental attitudes of Asians, Acheson stated that China, 
with its long proud history, was being forced into the Soviet orbit as a dependency of the 
Soviet political system and the Soviet economy.116 
While stating these political assurances, Acheson also made a statement regarding 
the Sino-Soviet Treaty saying that  
As old friends, we say to the Chinese people that we fully understand that 
their present unhappy status within the orbit of the Soviet Union is not the 
result of any choice of their own part, but has been forced upon them. We 
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understand that the Communist basis for their Government is similarly not 
the result of any free choice of their own…We do not intend to engage in 
any aggressive adventures against them. The American people will remain 
in the future, as we have been in the past, the friends of the Chinese 
people.117 
In addressing the attitude of the U.S. regarding China, Acheson stated, “Again, as 
old friends of the Chinese people, we say to them that the representatives of our country 
are leaving them not by any wish of ours….We regret this leaving by our people, but our 
Chinese friends will understand again where the responsibility lies.118“  
As seen above, in Acheson’s statements, terms regarding China had not 
significantly changed. Even after the communist treaty, Acheson constantly blames the 
Soviet side for the takeover in China, and that the Soviets intentions were to deceive and 
exploit the Chinese. Acheson makes a similar remark in a statement released to the press 
in March 31, 1950. It was specifically about the Soviet exploit of Sinkang oil and mineral 
resources. Acheson used the terms “exploit,” “impairment,” and “relinquishment” to 
describe the Soviet actions against Communist China. It can be noticed that the term 
“impoverished” was used to modify the PRC.119 
On June 25, 1950, when Communist North Korea invaded the South, the focus of 
U.S. attention in Asia was suddenly turned from China to Korea. The United States was 
almost immediately involved in the conflict by sending troops into South Korea. At the 
same time, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to position itself between mainland China 
and Taiwan. This action was an attempt to neutralize Taiwan and prevent it from being a 
point of danger upon the flank of the United Nations position. Truman neutralized the 
straits by stating that the Seventh Fleet would prevent any attack upon Taiwan, and 
Taiwan should not make any attack upon the mainland.120 With the major commitment in 
the Korean War, the U.S. put the China problem temporarily aside.  
                                                 
117 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, no. 22, PT2, 469. 
118 Ibid., 470. 
119 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, no. 22, PT2, 568. 
120 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, no. 23, PT2 (Washington, DC: Office 
of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1950), 463. 
 54 
With Korea in focus, Acheson’s position regarding Communist China can be 
observed in his message of July 18, 1950. This was a message replying to the Indian 
ambassador’s appeal to settle the conflict in Korea by admitting the PRC to the UN. 
While not fully recognizing the regime, he also did not entirely reject it—stating that the 
“the decision … for China’s seat in the United Nations is one which must be reached by 
the United Nations on its merits.”121  
After the successful Incheon landing that started on September 15, 1950, and 
ended on September 19, there were concerns in Washington about the possibilities of 
Chinese intervention in the Korean War. There had been a number of signs from the 
Chinese that indicated an increase in tension, and official warnings to the U.S.—although 
delivered by a mediator—that China would intervene if the U.S. forces crossed the 38th 
parallel. While there were concerns, on September 10, 1950, in a television interview 
regarding policies on Asia, Secretary Acheson replied to the question from Griffin 
Bancroft, a staff member of CBS in Washington, about the chances of Chinese 
Communists getting involved in the support of the Korean Communists. Acheson stated 
that,  
I would think it would be sheer madness on the part of the Chinese 
Communist to do that, and I see no advantage to them in doing it….Now I 
give the people in Peiping credit for being intelligent enough to see what 
is happening to them. Why they should want to further their own 
dismemberment and destruction by getting at cross purposes with all the 
free nations of the world who are inherently their friends and have always 
been friends of the Chinese as against this imperialism coming down from 
the Soviet Union I cannot see. And since there is nothing in it for them, I 
don’t see why they should yield to what is undoubtedly pressures from the 
Communist movement to get into this Korean row.122 
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Also, Acheson answered the question whether the United States had written off 
Asia by saying, “We still believe that the Chinese are going to be Chinese before they are 
going to be Communists.”123 
By examining these statements, we can conclude that Acheson had a clear 
position regarding the possibility of the PRC’s involvement in the Korean War—
Communist China would not intervene because it would be “sheer madness” to do so. 
The imperialistic character of the Soviet Union that was mentioned before in Acheson’s 
statements is again stated in the interview as well. Another expression that described the 
Chinese should be noticed. Acheson’s remark about China being “Chinese before they 
are going to be Communist” indicates that Acheson did not yet perceive the PRC as a 
fully committed Communist regime, and that the China’s ideology was more nationalistic 
than imperialistic. This could mean that Acheson fundamentally acknowledged China not 
as an enthusiastic participant in a Soviet plan, but as an incomplete government which 
had the possibility of negotiation and normal relations with the United States in the future.  
Another interesting point is that Acheson did not even consider the possibility of 
the PRC’s influence in initiating the Korean War. Now with the de-classified documents, 
evidence of Mao approving Kim Il-Sung’s plan of invasion has been revealed. 124  
Though there could have been discussions within the foreign policy-making circle and 
preparation for alternative options, Acheson stood by and pursued his belief that the PRC 
would not intervene. 
The Sino-Soviet treaty—which could have been interpreted as a full commitment 
to the Communist act—did not particularly change the rhetoric in Acheson’s statements. 
Also, while the non-aggressive U.S. position should have led to better treatment of 
Americans on the Chinese side, particularly the diplomatic personnel in China, the 
Communist officials, adding to the disrespect already shown American diplomats in 
China—such as the arrest and detention of an American group for almost a month in late 
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1949—seized the United States’ consular property in Beijing. 125  But, even after the 
aggressive actions against the United States, Acheson’s statements concerning 
Communist China remained constant; China was incapable, and was being deceived by 
the Soviets. Even after Chinese actions that indicated military action against the UN 
forces in the Korean War, it seemed to Acheson that the threats were not credible and he 
remained positive that Communist China would not live up to its words.  
In an attempt to explain the reasons for Acheson’s constant position on China, it 
would be valid to apply the reasons that were brought up earlier—he had not yet 
established a firm decision that the PRC was hostile to the Americans, or that he could 
have doubted the capability of Communist China to become an obstacle in the future. 
Though the escalating anti-American sentiment and threats—in particular, Chinese 
opposition of UN forces crossing the 38
th
 parallel—were rising, Acheson did not take 
Communist China seriously. The DICTION analysis of the statements made after the 
Sino-Soviet Alliance and before the Chinese intervention in the Korean War concludes 
that Acheson did not use aggressive terms to describe Communist China. While there was 
a slight rise in the “Aggression” scores during the period and a decrease in the “Optimism” 
score, it still is below average of the total score. This indicates that while there were 
events—China’s lean to the Soviet side and continuing threats of intervention in the 
Korean War—that could have shifted Acheson’s image of the PRC, he still did not think 
of Communist China in terms of a hostile image. 
4. After the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War 
In early November of 1950, armies of the Chinese Communist government 
carried out an offensive that resulted in the longest retreat of U.S. forces in history. 
Acheson’s first official statement regarding the Chinese intervention in the war was to 
clear intentions of the United States. He informed the public that the United States 
reassured the Chinese that there were no intentions toward their territory. Also, if U.S. 
actions were misread, the PRC should stop intervening in the Korean War. In the end, 
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Acheson added that if the Chinese actions were driven by other reasons, they would be 
met by “all the resolutions, and all the soberness, and all the wisdom” of the United 
States. 126  It should be noticed that while trying to address the situation delicately, 
expressions that could be thought aggressive began to appear. In a broadcast, later in the 
month, Acheson confirmed that the Chinese Communists had full acknowledgement that 
there were no U.S. intentions in China, and that they deceived the world—there were 
initial preparations of intervention before the Korean War and that the “cloak of pretense 
had been thrown off.”127 
Negative terms appear more frequently as the war with the Chinese Communists 
continued. Commenting on the PRC’s rejection of the cease-fire proposal, Acheson stated 
that it was “evidence of their contemptuous disregard of a world-wide demand for peace,” 
and that people should “face squarely and soberly the fact that the Chinese Communists 
have no intentions of ceasing their defiance.”128 In addressing the U.S. Far Eastern policy, 
Chinese actions were expressed as the “veil” of “shabby pretense of aggression.”129 Also, 
Acheson referred the Chinese regime as the “Red leaders,”130 and in an address before 
the UN General Assembly, he commented about the Chinese demand for representation 
in the UN as a “level of barbarism.”131 Aggressive terms that describe China can be 
constantly found in Acheson’s statements and addresses—”the aggressor,” “communist 
treachery.”132  Sarcastic remarks can also be noticed—in a press conference Acheson 
made extemporaneous remarks to a question about Beijing’s “Peace Conferences.” He 
replied by stating that the conference was,  
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an obvious propaganda operation in which the Chinese Communists, while 
taking an active part in defying the United Nations and carrying the war 
into Korea and while joining with the Soviet Government in its violent 
“hate campaign,” are continuing to hold “peace conferences.”133 
Another interesting change to notice is that, before the Chinese intervention, 
China had been described as a helpless nation deceived by the Soviets and ignorant of its 
actions. After months of war, Acheson stated—in a metaphorical expression—that the 
Chinese knew the consequences of their actions and used communism as a tool to 
influence the world. Comments on the strength of communist propaganda also show a 
change in attitude. Stating that the “masses of people in China are organized effectively 
against us, so that they are a very strong opponent,”134 indicate that the leadership was 
starting to perceive China in a different view—the opposite image of a weak Communist 
regime. The shift from an incapable image of China can be also found in a comment that 
characterized the Communist forces. In the past, the Communist bloc was usually 
referred to as the “Soviets and its satellites,” but in an address made at Detroit, Acheson 
explicitly stated the Communist armed forces in the order of the Soviets, the Chinese 
Communists, and the European satellites. It was the first time that the Chinese 
Communists were described by their own name rather than as a Soviet satellite.  
Chinese actions were expressed in terms of less tolerance also. Replying to a 
question at a press conference about whether the Red Chinese were prepared to adhere to 
the Geneva Conventions, Acheson stated “none of them have been adhered to in practice, 
although they said at the outset that they were going to do so.”135 In the past, Chinese 
actions were eased off by expressions of an ignorant and ill-educated of the communist 
government—that the PRC was not familiar with the international rules and standards. 
But in a press conference in early September of 1952—regarding the maltreatment of 
American citizens in China—terms such as “brutal callousness” and “third-degree 
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methods”136  were used to express Chinese actions. Acheson ended his statement by 
saying, “These Communist crimes will be forever condemned by those who believe in 
simple justice and fair play for human beings.”137 This change in terminology should be 
compared with the terms that described earlier Chinese actions against American citizens 
in China. 
The last point to note is the statements that inform the public of Communist 
China’s preparation for war. Acheson’s earlier statements clearly indicate that due to lack 
of military capability the Chinese would not intervene. After the intervention, evidence of 
a possible Chinese action—some that were neglected before—as emphasized, resulted in 
the hardening of aggressive feelings towards Communist China.138 
It could be said that all wavering towards China was thoroughly eliminated after 
the active Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. Any thought of the chance of U.S. 
support for the PRC was abruptly ended both within and outside official government 
circles. All aspects of policy towards the PRC were now directed at weakening the 
Communist regime—recognition, admission to the United Nations, trade, etc. This was 
seen not only in executive actions, but in legislative movements as well. There was a 
resolution passed by Congress in late January of 1951, urging that the United Nations 
brand Communist China as an aggressor and also that the Communists should not be 
admitted to the United Nations. This indicated that Acheson now perceived Communist 
China with a hostile image which was reflected in policy decisions. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
This chapter analyzes the results and findings from the previous chapter. It 
attempts to connect the possible turning points in the U.S.-China relations with the results 
of DICTION 7.0. Then with the findings from the manual assessment, it tries to explain 
the patterns and changes, and thus prove the hypothesis. 
A. ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-COMMUNIST CHINA RELATIONS 
This section examines U.S.-Communist China relations during the periods 
analyzed previously. Since the degree of a relationship between two countries cannot be 
evaluated and determined by a numerical value, it is important to define a method in 
which the relationship can be expressed. Therefore, in this assessment, the relationship of 
the two countries is determined by examining whether the Communist Chinese leaned 
toward the United States or the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union—
the main communist influencer—was the prime enemy of the United States. Actions such 
as embracing communism or allying with the Soviets were considered to be an act of 
threat to the U.S. Grand Strategy. Therefore, examining whether the Chinese were 
leaning to either the United States or the Soviet Union side can present a good 
perspective in determining U.S.-Communist China relations.  
In the timeline of U.S.-China relations, it could be noticed that the Chinese 
Communists gradually began to lean to the Soviet side. With anti-American actions, such 
as detention of U.S. citizens and allying with the primary enemy of the United States, 
from the proclamation of the PRC to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, it can 
be stated that the Chinese shifted farther away from the U.S. side as time passed—
meaning the U.S.-China relationship deteriorated during the period. 
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE DICTION 7.0 RESULTS 
In this section, the results of the analysis that indicate the level of “Aggression” 
and “Optimism” are examined. First, the research looks into the “Aggression” factor. 
Figure 1 shows the aggressiveness the program recognized in Acheson’s statements. 
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Point 1 indicates the time of the proclamation of the PRC, Point 2 the Sino-Soviet 
Alliance, and Point 3 the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Aggression Score of Acheson’s Statements 
According to the results, during periods 1 through 3, the aggressiveness in the 
statements did not significantly change. From the lowest score of 3.56 to the highest of 
6.99, the scores keep an average of 4.9. After the program analyzed statements past point 
3, it can be identified that the scores significantly increased. From the lowest score of 8.7 
to the highest of 26.09, in the period past point 3, the average of the aggression score is 
17.2.  
So, with these results, it can be stated that during the period when Communist 
China’s government was being established and the Sino-Soviet Treaty was being signed, 
and threats regarding the UN forces crossing the 38
th
 parallel emerged, Acheson’s 
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statements had less aggressiveness than in the latter period when the Chinese intervened. 
This indicates that Acheson did not consider Communist China as having a hostile image 
in the beginning. However, that view eventually changed after the Chinese intervention in 
the Korean War.  
Next, the study examines the “Optimism” factor of the results (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Optimism Score of Acheson’s Statements. 
Figure 2 shows the optimism the program identified in Acheson’s statements. 
Points 1, 2, and 3 indicate the same events that were mentioned earlier. According to the 
results, during periods 1 through 3 and beyond, although there is a decrease after the 
Sino-Soviet alliance, the optimism in the statements did not significantly change. 
Contrasting with the “Aggressiveness” results, the optimism score had an average of 49.6 
in periods 1 through 3, and an average of 48.7 in the latter period. 
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The “Optimism” results differed dramatically from the results of “Aggression.” 
Although there was a decrease in the scores after the Chinese intervention in the Korean 
War, a significant change in the pattern cannot be identified. This indicates that despite 
the fact that there was a change in the rhetoric of Acheson’s speeches—as seen in the 
“Aggression” scores—some elements were constantly reflected in the statements, causing 
the optimistic tone to remain stable. This observation is examined in the next section.  
C. ASSESSMENT OF THE MAIN TERMS THAT DESCRIBE COMMUNIST 
CHINA IN THE TIMELINE 
As shown in the previous examination, there are distinctive terms—which also 
reflect the images of Communist China—that Acheson used to describe the Chinese 
Communists during the defined periods. While using different terms, it can be observed 
that there is a significant change in Acheson’s statements after the Chinese intervention 
in the Korean War. Figure 3 shows a summarized version of the terms that Secretary 
Acheson used to describe the Chinese Communists. 
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Figure 3.  Terms Used to Describe Communist China. 
Before the proclamation of the PRC, Acheson states that Communist China is 
being deceived in the Soviet movement to communism, and mostly shows aggression 
toward the Soviets. After the proclamation, the aggressive rhetoric regarding the Soviets 
has not changed. Even in statements protesting the maltreatment of U.S. citizens in China, 
terms that depict an immature government that does not know any better are used instead 
of strong language with aggressive connotations. The Sino-Soviet Treaty, which was a 
statement to the world that mainland China was a now main supporter of the Soviet 
Union, did not change Acheson’s perception of the Chinese. Aggressive terms against the 
Soviets are constantly used while expressions of sympathy and compassion are used to 
describe the Chinese. It is interesting to note that within these periods, positive  
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expressions that indicate a chance that Communist China would realize the Soviet 
deception and be a normal member of the international community are used in Acheson’s 
statements.  
After the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, terms that describe Communist 
China change dramatically; the Chinese Communists are characterized as having 
deliberately deceived the rest of the world by secretly planning and aiding the North 
Korean attack in the Korean War, and that its intention to join the United Nations was 
part of a communist plot. This change in rhetoric significantly differs from the sorts of 
expressions used before. The United States had a passive view of the submission of the 
PRC to the UN, and also, Acheson precisely stated that the Chinese did not have the 
ability to intervene in the Korean War. After the event, however, reports of the PRC’s 
military capabilities and its initial preparations can be constantly observed in Acheson’s 
statements.  
Therefore, according to this analysis, Acheson initially did have a perception or 
image of a weak and incapable Communist China that did not have the ability to 
influence the American strategy in Asia. Also, Acheson clearly thought that the Chinese 
Communists had a possibility to escape the Soviet influence and have normal relations 
with the United States. But after the Chinese intervention, Acheson’s perception of and 
hopes for Communist China changed. 
D. FINAL ANALYSIS 
After the examining the scores of the DICTION 7.0 program, one initial 
assumption of the research did not match the results. In the beginning, it was thought that 
the “optimism” score results would be in inverse proportion to the “aggression” score. It 
was stated earlier that the research would try to observe the rise in aggression and the 
decrease in optimism during the timeline. After analyzing the results, it was observed that 
while the aggression scores changed dramatically, the optimistic tone of Acheson’s 
statements remained fairly constant during the period examined. These contradicting 
results lead to the question of the validity of the argument. The conditions of proving the 
hypothesis right was that the “Aggression” score would increase and the “Optimism” 
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score decrease after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Thus, the study next 
explains the possible reason why DICTION 7.0 presented these results, and finds 
evidence to support the argument that although the results are unexpected, it does not 
affect the conclusion that Acheson developed a hostile image of Communist China after 
the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. 
Through this research, it was revealed that—in a speech or statement—the tone of 
optimism is not necessarily in inverse to the tone of aggression. This means that these 
factors can be applied as different indicators in identifying a certain tone in a statement. 
Although the results can raise questions regarding the use of the “Optimism” factor in the 
analysis, it has also helped identify a certain image of Communist China. While it can be 
thought that Acheson’s positive and optimistic image of Communist China shifted to a 
hostile one, the results lead to the question of whether the Secretary ever had an 
optimistic image of Communist China. Whatever the answer is, there was no shift in the 
optimism tone. Since the research was limited to Acheson only, it cannot compare the 
results to a specific standard to identify the level of optimism he had of the Communist 
Chinese. But, by analyzing his statements manually, the pre-existing image that Acheson 
had of Communist China, which was that it was weak and less capable, can be noticed. 
These terms and expressions do not affect the “Optimism” results of the program. 
When using the DICTION 7.0 program to analyze the results, “Communist China” 
and “Chinese Communist” were applied to specify the search for the subject. Also, in the 
manual analysis process, the research took into account only the terms and expressions—
including modifiers and metaphors—regarding Communist China. The researcher finds 
that this was the problem in the relatively constant scores in the “Optimism” rating. As 
seen in the manual analysis for the explanations of the DICTION results, while changes 
in aggressive terms that describe Communist China can be found in the statements, terms 
and expressions that indicate a positive and optimistic view of Communist China cannot 
be found throughout Acheson’s statements. The terms that described Communist China 
were mainly about the weakness of the regime’s status—such as “ill-equipped” and 
“exploited.”  
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The following are two analyzed statements with the highest and the lowest 
“Aggression” score, respectively. The first statement the “Maltreatment of Americans in 
Communist China”—with the highest score of 26.09—represent Acheson’s shift to a 
hostile China image. In the statement the Chinese Communists’ demands were referred to 
as “barbarism”139  while Acheson opposed the PRC’s submission to the UN. In the 
statement, terms that indicate a positive and optimistic view of China cannot be found. 
The second statement, “Evacuation of Americans from Shanghai”—with the lowest score 
of 2.06—does not refer to the PRC authorities in specific aggressive terms or in positive 
and optimistic ones. The terms and expressions that described Communist China before 
the Chinese intervention in the Korean War were mainly about the inferior status of the 
regime, reflecting Acheson’s image of China.  
The results of the “Optimism” factor imply that in performing a content analysis 
there are more factors to consider for more objective and accurate results. External 
factors, such as certain events influencing the statement, should be simultaneously 
considered when using the content analysis method. Also, though not used directly to 
support the hypothesis, the results revealed Acheson’s possible pre-existing image of 
Communist China. The Secretary thought that the Communist Chinese were weak and 
less capable in influence, which later changed as seen in the “Aggressive” score. 
With the explanation of the consistency of the “optimistic” score and its 
implications, the three assessments—the U.S.-China relations, the manual assessment of 
Acheson’s statements, and the DICTION 7.0 assessment results—should be examined. 
The research was to test the hypothesis that the Chinese intervention in the Korean War 
was the main factor that formed a hostile image of China, which dominated the U.S. 
China policy until the normalization of U.S.-China relations. In the earlier part of this 
thesis, images and perceptions and how they are externally expressed were mentioned—
in the form of statements in general cases. By analyzing statements of the individual  
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regarding the events that happened in the course of U.S.-China relations, the research 
intended to find certain patterns in the rhetoric that could indicate the general perception 
of an individual and how those perception change. 
According to the events that occurred during the time period that was examined, 
U.S.-China relations deteriorated increasingly. At the same time the United States was 
initiating a strategy of containing communism and the influence of the Soviet Union in 
particular, the deteriorating relations with Communist China did not specifically affect 
U.S. China policy—despite the hostile actions of the PRC toward the United States that 
followed. Following the event of the communist takeover in China—the proclamation of 
the PRC, the Sino-Soviet Alliance, the detention and maltreatment of U.S. citizens in 
China—the United States had a rather wavering policy and actions in regard to the 
Communist Chinese. After the Chinese intervened in the Korean War, a firm China 
policy started to form in Washington.  
In general, when forming a foreign policy in regard to another country, there are 
simple factors to consider. When one country takes aggressive actions against another 
country, it is common sense to form a defensive strategy or take action to stop the hostile 
actions. Also, when one country forms an alliance with another country that is regarded 
as a primary enemy, it is necessary to think that the alliance will be threatening to one’s 
interests. In the course of the Communist Chinese leaning toward the Soviets, U.S. 
actions to delay or stop the formation of an anti-American community in East Asia 
cannot be specifically seen. Why did the leadership not take any precise actions to 
prevent the outcome of these events? 
The hypothesis answers the question and the question why the U.S. leadership did 
not take initial actions to prevent the Chinese intervention from the beginning. It can be 
stated that the weak and incapable image of China held by the U.S. policy makers caused 
them to disregard China as a factor of influence in America’s Grand Strategy. This notion 
can be supported by the results our research obtained. In assessing the statements of 
Acheson—regarded as one of the most important individuals in the making of foreign 
policy—a constant expression of a weak and incapable China, and also for a chance of  
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positive relations between the United States and Communist China was observed. This 
consistency was also supported by more objective evidence from examining the analysis 
results from the DICTION 7.0 program.  
While the Chinese Communists were gradually leaning toward the Soviets, there 
was no dramatic change in the main terms that described China in Acheson’s statements 
until a certain point, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The “Aggressive” score 
results show a similar pattern with the chart of terms used to describe Communist 
China—where the change in the previous consistency was at the point of Chinese 
intervention. This suggests that Acheson, despite the Chinese leaning to the Soviet side, 
did not set a firm China policy because he held a non-aggressive image of a weak and 
incapable China. After the intervention, the results show a change in the terms that are 
used to characterize China, and also the change in the “aggression” score that matches 
this change.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
After the normalization of relations with the PRC—and China’s corresponding 
economic rise over the last thirty years—the United States and China have expanded their 
relations on various issues. Now that China is the world’s second largest economy, 
Washington urges the Chinese leaders to play an active and cooperative role in balancing 
and sustaining global development. The U.S. leadership hopes that China, as a member of 
the United Nations Security Council, will engage positively in international security 
issues such as nuclear threats and territorial disputes—being a stabilizer in the Asia-
Pacific region. Also in a bilateral relationship, the United States cooperates with the 
Chinese government to set rules and norms that would both benefit the material and 
intellectual exchanges between the two countries. Meanwhile, U.S. policy makers take 
steps to discourage and make regulations for China’s illegal activities such as cyber 
intrusions and violations of intellectual property rights in the trading process. 140 
Moreover, now that the United States and China are the world’s biggest contributors to 
greenhouse gas emissions, bilateral efforts to reduce global warming are being observed. 
While relations between the two countries seem to be making progress, there are 
still concerns about whether the Chinese will be a responsible stakeholder in the 
future.141 Though China does not possess the military or the economic capabilities to 
match the United States, many are worried about the consequences of the shift in 
power—such as China’s economic dominance in the Asian region. 142  Questions are 
being raised whether the United States and China can manage the relationship and avoid 
confrontation.143  
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In a report on policies regarding U.S.-China relations, Susan V. Lawrence a 
specialist in Asian affairs at the Congressional Research Service notes that there is still an 
ongoing mistrust between the countries. The U.S. talks of new cooperation with the 
Chinese are considered to be a strategy to balance the Chinese influence in the region by 
many observers. She also brings up the issue of the different political systems as being 
one of the reasons for mistrust. The Americans are disturbed by the authoritative form 
and actions that the Chinese government practices, and the Chinese leaders are threatened 
by the pressures that U.S. leaders give on the issues of basic human rights and 
treatment.144 
Lawrence also states that the mistrust is especially emphasized on security issues. 
The Chinese government perceives the U.S. presence in Asia as part of a containment 
strategy, while the U.S. government considers the People’s Liberation Army’s 
modernization as a step to deter U.S. movements in the region, which could later 
challenge U.S. influence. Cyber security threats as well as the actual display of military 
capabilities are being frequently observed, making the mistrust deepen.145 
While there have been improvements in the channels of communication between 
the two countries, the actual intentions of both countries cannot be precisely determined. 
Systems that provide reliable information about the intentions and the perceptions of the 
other are needed in order to make good policy decisions. A perception the one country 
has regarding another is also crucially important, because policy decisions are made by 
individuals who can be affected by existing images. So, knowing the image the opponent 
has of one’s own country can be used as the basis of forming a good policy. In the U.S.-
China case, if the leadership in Washington has reliable information of what the U.S. 
image is to the Chinese and the Chinese have the same for the United States, there can be 
better understanding of the others’ actions, which will be lead to the reduction of mistrust 
to some degree. A reliable method in comparing images to reality is needed. 
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This research started with the initial task of learning the early modern U.S.-China 
relations. It started to question why there is a commonly held mistrust between the two 
countries and when the negative images of one another began. It set out to prove the 
hypothesis that the image of China that America held shifted after the Chinese 
intervention in the Korean War, and possibly why. After selecting an important 
individual who could influence the formation of U.S. foreign policy, the research used a 
content analysis method to examine the image of China held in Washington. To support 
the assessment, a computer-based analysis was used to obtain more objective evidence. It 
was concluded that before the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, Acheson’s image 
of Communist China was one of weakness and incapability. Although the Communist 
Chinese government took actions that could be perceived as a threat to the United 
States—such as being a major communist regime, allying with the Soviet Union, and 
threatening to intervene in the Korean War—Acheson did not regard China with a hostile 
image. After the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, Acheson adopted a hostile 
China image which affected his policy decisions regarding U.S.-China relations. 
The methods in determining the U.S. China image in the research can have 
multiple implications. First, it was an attempt to support the existing arguments that the 
Chinese intervention in the Korean War was the main reason for the shift in the China 
image—while many literatures claim the Korean War as the main point, most do not 
present any evidence to support the argument. The identification of frequently used terms 
and the results from an analysis program provide the literature with more objective 
evidence.  
Second, statements made by a political figure can be used in the study of political 
phenomena. While examining the statements of Acheson, it was revealed that certain 
patterns and changes regarding a specific subject can be identified. In Acheson’s case, the 
wavering political actions matched his use of terms that characterized a weak China and 
less aggression in the tone of his speeches. After the Chinese intervention in the Korean 
War, the firm China policy—actively opposing the PRC submission to the UN, forming a 
containment policy—matched the use of terms that characterized a hostile and aggressive 
China and an increase in the aggressive tone of Acheson’s speeches. This implies that 
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when examining a political figure or the political decisions made, analyzing the 
statements on the subject can be useful to the research. 
The method used in this study can be applied to the current concerns in U.S.-ROK 
relations. While the Republic of Korea has been one of the main allies of the United 
States in Asia, questions are increasing whether the Koreans will keep their commitment 
in the alliance, as ties with the Chinese increase.146  Park Bun-Soon talks about the 
Chinese efforts to pursue economic cooperation of Asian countries in Northeast Asia. He 
demonstrates that the after the normalization between South Korea and China, and 
China’s economic reform, Korea’s main trading partner has shifted from the United 
States to China. 147  With increasing economic interdependence, the current trend in 
cultural exchange, and the proximity of the two countries show the potential for a strong 
relationship. Also, there are fewer conflicts of interest between Korea and China. From a 
realistic perspective, the conditions for the ROK to ally itself with the Chinese are better 
than that of any other country in the region. This is raising concerns—some state that the 
relationship resembles the Sino-Soviet relations with the United States. 
Though there are various communication channels between the United States and 
the ROK, it is still possible for intentions to be misperceived by government officials on 
both sides. As seen in the case of Acheson, despite several events that could have helped 
him make an accurate assessment of Communist China, his position did not change until 
situations escalated to war. A constant evaluation of the mutual images held by leadership 
of both countries can help guide policy makers to make better decisions based on 
accurate data. The increasing ties between the ROK and China do not necessarily mean 
that the Koreans will think of Americans as the “hegemonic force that oppresses brother 
China.” As the image and perception of an individual affects his or her actions, the 
assessment of the Korean leadership’s perception of the United States, and vice versa, 
will contribute to an understanding in the process of making foreign policies. 
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